جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "طراحی سازوکار" در نشریات گروه "اقتصاد"

Knowledge-based companies often need the participation of venture capitalists or government facilities for prototyping and industrial production of their products. Since, in such cases, hidden behavioral issues such as adverse selection and moral hazard will emerge, in this study, we are looking for the design of mechanisms to explain the optimal conditions for providing government facilities to these knowledge-based companies by considering these behavioral issues. The mechanism to achieve the desired goal is to provide two facility provision contracts: a contract with the entrepreneur's maximum financial commitment and minimum facility rate and the other with the entrepreneur's minimum financial commitment and maximum facility rate. Given that government facilities have a social cost, it is appropriate for the government to enter projects with positive externality but not supported by venture capitalists. This minimizes the redundancy of projects.
Inspired by the study of Lach et al. (2020) and calibrating the parameters based on the reports of the Presidential Vice President for Science and Technology, banking information, and research and technology funds in 2020, the simulation of the model for Iran's economy showed that the implementation of the second contract leads to higher social welfare. The government's financial support to reduce the redundancy of facilities, along with the private sector's support, improves social welfare.

One of the obvious disadvantages and weaknesses of Iran’s national five-year development plans in achieving its goals is the lack or severe weakness of structures, institutions, and self-adjusting, effective/efficient motivational mechanisms (incentive compatibility) for decentralized agents. The mechanism design theory was proposed to solve this important issue and directly consider the internal economic motivations of agents in policies and development plans and has been widely used in recent decades. Mechanism design can be viewed as the art of designing the rules of a game to achieve a social desired outcome. In order to use mechanism design in planning and policy, first the socially desirable outcomes are determined by policymakers and central planners; then, the rules of the game are determined and guaranteed to create sufficient incentives for agents to perform actions and activities in line with the aforementioned goals or outcomes. In such an incentive-compatible environment, the decentralized agents "act almost as desired by the policymakers and planners", and in this way, the individual goals of the actors and the social goals of the policymakers and planners are simultaneously realized, and so are the objectives of development plans. Our results show that as long as the macro policies, goals, laws, and regulations desired by policymakers and central planners are not supported by the design and establishment of a self-adjusting, effective/efficient motivational mechanism for decentralized agents, there would be no guarantee for their proper implementation. Thus, the design, implementation, and practical use of this modern theory are of great necessity in the seventh development plan.

The interactions formed between the people of a society shape the “reality of the social life” of each society. It is clear that the thought of social scholars is both influencing and influenced by the formation of a particular way of interaction, but the important point is that each social thinker is trying to provide a meaningful life in his or her own perspective. But it is certain is the difference in scholars' interpretation of "improvement", "progress" or "regulated society" largely rooted in their philosophical assumptions. In this article, without going back to philosophical assumptions, we are going to provide an interpretation of economics. By this definition, we intend to rule out the "economic science (without adjective)" and to expose a new path for those interested in Islamic economics.  In this article, Islamic economics which is called the Jurisprudence of social interactions, is the science of designing and presenting mechanisms of equitable benefit to society. Each socio-economic school proposes a specific mechanism for dealing with the problem of extracting, producing, distributing and consuming any goods in society to meet the needs of individuals in the community as well as to eliminate potential conflicts between them; It will include different bundles of property rights for that particular goods. Jurisprudence of social interactions presents Islamic mechanisms by defining and restricting property rights deriving from religion. "Social Interaction Jurisprudence" reflects a different view of the purpose, subject area, and method of Islamic social science, including Islamic economics, in the construction of society.

I International relations are full of complexities due to their multifaceted and multilateral nature. To understand decision making processes and the payoffs of their strategies, players are enabled to utilize their capabilities to impact the strategic decision payoffs. As an example of this decision structure we can refer to the international disputes and conflicts including the sanctions. The Islamic Republic of Iran’s interests in international arena have been influenced by the changing interests of the other stakeholders in the coalition of the United States sanction against Iran. In order to analyze and predict the equilibriums of the players positions in the complex international space of the sanctions, game theory, mechanism design, multi-agent systems, and artificial intelligent as new instruments of decision theory are utilized to resolve the transactions and processes influenced by the human decisions. In this research, a policy spectrum is defined according to the strategies of Iran, the United States of America and other stakeholder’s countries. Modeling and simulating the behavior of players on this continuous spectrum which includes two extremes of capitulation and confrontation shows that in the current situation, Iran’s equilibrium and dominated strategy is emphasizing the maintenance of the current agreement in JCPOA, although this position is in the lower range of the spectrum of the current agreement. In these sanctions there is a possibility of a tragedy of the commons. In order to prevent its occurrence, the results of this study imply that the dominant strategy, given that all the players are rational, is to preserve stability, security, and integrity of Iran as a regional power. In order to achieve a stable equilibrium of the game, the stakeholders try to maximize the social welfare function instead of individual participants’ payoff. The rational strategy of Iran is to stay in JCPOA, strengthening political ties with the European players, and to empower its own military and social securities.

In the real world, dispersion of suppliers and demanders prevents market formation. Kidney market is a true example of such markets that is not formed due to thin features. To tackle the problem, one needs to design a mechanism that can both revive the market and ensure the most efficient supply-demand matching. A matching is efficient when no other matching can allocate agents to a better place, or cannot strongly allocate an agent to a better place. To this end, the mechanism should be designed to allocate agents to their highest preferences, so that agents cannot make another better choice. In this study, information on 20 patient-donor pairs was recorded at a clearing house in Hamedan province in 2016. After processing data, the patients’ preferences were ordered in terms of matching blood group, illness period, donor’s age, kinship relationship with donor, and gender of donor. Then, a mechanism was designed to match 17 patients with the most efficient kidneys. When patient ith matches donor ith and registers at the clearing house, the mechanism can offer her/his the most efficient kidney. If a given patient finds a donor better than his/her peer donor, then he/she will leave his/her peer donor. Otherwise, he/she matches her paired donor.

One of the most critical market duties is to ensure coordination between the supplier and demander. When the market fails to fulfill this duty efficiently, it either does not form or fail and disintegrate. This is because the number of market participants is either too large or too small, and/or the market experiences conditions where the participants scarcely give voice to their priorities with ease and confidence. Economists contend that the fundamental challenge in market design is that we sufficiently understand complex markets and develop our abilities to the point where we can reconstruct or redesign them upon their failure and/or use market-like mechanisms. When the process of price adjustment is slowly at work, economic factors tend to select what they want in the price they observe. Still, many markets are by far beyond this simple economic rule. In such markets, we may not readily obtain what we need even when we can afford it. In other words, while to want to and to be able to (to want a product and to be able to pay for it) generate demand in common markets, these two factors do not necessarily present us as customers in the complex markets since commodities are offered with variable qualities so that it is impossible to form a market for them. Some markets are so complex that people cannot select what they need despite their willingness and ability to pay for it. That is, price mechanism and automatic adjustment do not provide the market with balance although this does not imply the impossibility of market formation. . Market design theory and matching theory seek to provide a stage where suppliers and demanders can meet without using the traditional market mechanism (price mechanism). In this theory, price mechanism does not offer solution to the problem of resource allocation. Rather, allocation is based on suppliers and demanders’ conditions. Based on the proposed algorithm, ranked preferences replace and act as price system. One of the most important applications of market design in the past decade has been to the kidney and body parts market. for the purposes of market design, one should employ an algorithm that can overcome the causes of market failure such as returns to scale, externalities, uncertainty, thinness, congestion and insecurity to demonstrate preferences.These factors affect both market failure and lack of market formation.
The present study aimed to address the problem of kidney market and provide a solution to the problem. Dispersed market participants, limited number of suppliers and demanders, and poor supplier-demander relationshipmay lead to market (kidney exchange mechanism) failure or impede market formation.
In order to resolve this deficiencies we should design a mechanism for overcoming the market failures in order to reach to an efficient and stable allocation. Kidney market is a true example of this type of markets. Therefore, it is suggested to create a clearing room in which the information of kidney donors and patients be recorded and after processing this information and determine patient preferences, the matching algorithm could match the compatible couples(donors and patients)þ and kidney exchange can be facilitated. The present study was carried out in Hamedan Province in 2016 using matching theory which is a subset of market design and mechanism design. To this end, the information for fortyþ people , twenty of them patients and twenty others Kidney donator were recorded in the clearing room. Then, after blood and tissues tests and determining patient preferences and forming matching algorithms, seventeen of twenty patients could receive kidney transplant. However, without using this mechanisms only nine patient could have received transplan, Also using this mechanism will result at least 163817796 Rials per patient.

Credence goods market is one of the markets that the asymmetric information has transformed it to a missing market. Those goods and services that the applicant cannot determine the exact amount of their expenses due to the asymmetric information are called credence goods. From the economist's perspective, transaction in a market where participants are ignorant about each other is a game with incomplete information. Hence, it is necessary to find a way to achieve a desired and optimal output by leading the individual's strategic behaviour in incomplete information conditions. Mechanism design, as a sub-discipline of game theory, analyses how equilibrium behaviour depends on the rules. As well, it answers to this question that how rules that implement desired market outcomes look like. In addition, there are internal mechanisms such as Islamic and religious teachings that reduce more social losses arising from asymmetric information in credence goods market with a lower cost.