جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « قرارداد نفتی ایران » در نشریات گروه « اقتصاد »

One of the issues which internationally is important in the oil industry is related to the Upstream industry of oil contracts. Changes made in these contracts consist of differences made directly in relation to the importance of the number of hydrocarbon sources and the number of shares each party is going to gain. If more structure of these contracts is emphasized and fortified, more duties and places of each party will be complicated. In this research, the comparison is made between two contract models which have been recently proposed and overviewed. The criterion used in selected contracts is from the National Iranian south oil company (NISOC) and Iranian Petroleum Contracts (IPC). The research has concentrated on the efficient economic cost role used in these contracts. A questionnaire was conducted based on the analytical hierarchy process, and a survey was conducted among the professionals of the oil industry. The results showed that most of those who participated in the survey agreed that the National Iranian South Oil Company’s Contract (NISOC) has a better criterion for the efficient role in economic cost

The purpose of this study is to compare the economic efficiency of Iran's petroleum contracts, buyback contracts, and production-sharing contracts. This study also determined the optimum path for production and drilling operations in the Yadavaran oil field which has special importance because it is a joint field with Iraq. It was estimated using real field data and the SQP algorithm by MATLAB software. First, the objective function, the constraints of each contract model, and the cost function are defined and expressed based on field data. For the objective function, the oil price is determined based on the reference price scenario and based on the forecast of the US Energy Information Administration (EIA). Cao et al (2009) 's cost function model is also modified by using historical field data (first development phase data) to be applied to the study field. The results show that the most efficient oil contract is the Iran petroleum contract, with a low floor for capital costs and no limit to the number of drilled wells. it was proved that the buyback contract with the ceiling of capital costs incompatible with the recovery coefficient has recorded the lowest efficiency. Also, the Iran petroleum contract can be a good alternative to the buyback contract, because it can well solve the problems of the buyback contract, especially for joint oil fields where the priority of the objective function of the maximum cumulative production over the objective function of the maximum present value of the total profit is more desirable.

Since the national wealth of oil-rich countries including Iran is connected to petroleum resources, these countries attempt to make their fiscal regimes and licensing system more attractive to international oil companies and investors. On the oil company side risks and uncertainties in oil and gas exploration and production are important challenges when deciding between different projects. This paper identifies the uncertainties and risks present in all stages of an oil and gas development project. Each of the identified risks is quantified using sensitivity analysis. Comparing contractual parameters of Iranian Petroleum Contracts with those of Iran’s buy back contract and other selected oil contract models in the Middle East including Qatar’s production sharing agreement and Iraq’s technical service contract, the paper proposes some changes to the contractual parameters of the Iranian Petroleum Contract. We notice that the amended contract reduces risks both for investing company and IranAfter applying the mentioned amendments, the standard deviation measured for the financial indicators of both the government and the investor was reduced confirming the reducing of contractual risks and improving the contract performance for both parties. In addition, all persons involved in preparation and implementation of Iranian petroleum contract whether as the first or the second party agree with the proposed amendments.

In this article the rate of return (ROR) and risk factors faced by international oil company (IOC), in IPC contract of Darkhowein oil field is modeled. For this purpose, we analyze the IPC contract specific risk factors that can contribute to a reduction in the rate of return for the international oil company including oil price, production level, capital cast, operating cost, and remuneration. The results of the cash flow risk analysis show the impact of these factors on the contractor's rate of return on IPC contracts is not significant in comparison to Buy-back contracts. The most important risk factor in Buy-back contracts is capital cast, which affects a large part of the contractor's returns, but in these contracts, this risk has been significantly reduced due to the government's additional compensation. In general, according to the results, it can be said that in IPC contracts, the contractor's return rate has not been heavily influenced by risk factors, and therefore the risk of the international oil company has fallen in these contracts.

Production Sharing Contract (PSC), Buyback Contract (BBC) and Iran Petroleum Contract (IPC) are considered as three rival contracts in upstream oil & gas field in Iran. So, decisionmakers in the process of selecting a suitable contract from the set of three mentioned contracts consider a set of jurisprudential, legal and economic conditions about these contracts. In this paper with the aim of explaining the economic capacity of the three contracts in comparision with each other and based on Static Optimal Methods, we compare these contacts in terms of two important economic indices of optimal investment and oil production and then, we prioritize them. Finally, we have concluded that upstream contracts of Production Sharing, Iran Petroleum Contract and Buyback are ranked in the first, the second and the third place from the perspective of optimal investment level, and from the perspective of optimal oil production level, in case of more participation of private sector and less interference of public ector, these contracts are ranked the first, the second and the third, respectively.