جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « کنش جمعی » در نشریات گروه « اقتصاد »

Many of the common natural resources of the world are in critical conditions. The solution to this crisis is the development of effective management institutions. However, there is no consensus on these institutions. Some economists believe that creating a privately owned entity can solve the management problems of these resources. Others support the control of resources by the central government. Some institutionalists consider the local management strategy as the solution to this crisis. In this study, an empirical meta-analysis was performed to examine what solution the Iranian studies on the management of water (as a common natural resource) have favored more and what factors they have considered for its success or failure. For this purpose, about 120 articles were collected from the Database of National Publications (Magiran), Noor Specialized Magazines Website (Noormags), Scientific Information Database (SID) of ACECR, and Comprehensive Portal of Humanities using ‘water management’ as the keyword. Seventy-three of these articles were related to the subject of the current study. The results of this research showed that most of these studies (about 70%) used a local participatory management solution and in order to investigate the reasons for its success or failure, they paid more attention to physical factors than institutional rules and arrangements. Thirty percent of the studies supported the market or government solution. In conclusion, this study suggests that more comprehensive approaches such as Ostrom’s analysis be used in future studies to find the most appropriate management method and its effectiveness in analyses so that common resources such as water can be managed more efficiently.

The processes of collective action of individuals within the government organization and the formation and modification of these processes in the private sector have fundamental differences with collective action. A collective action, either in the form of an activity or in the form of a reform of an entity, both has transaction costs for agents within the process. So, a collective action within the government organization is like an institutional reform that is regarded as a voluntary public good that needs active participation of various political, administrative, and economic agents. In this paper, we tend to provide a framework for reviewing the collective action of these agents in order to facilitate investment in North Khorasan province as an example of economic reform. The data are collected by questionnaire and analyzed by statistical methods, three groups of political, administrative and economic agents active in the province. The results indicate that 10 components of values and norms, learning and repetition, group size, free riding, rent seeking, incomplete information, selective incentives, conflicts of interest, individuals and groups of beneficiaries, and heterogeneity of individuals, all have significant effect on the collective action of political, administrative and economic agents of this province. Moreover, a significant part of the collective action differences between these agents is explained by the components of transaction costs, including three categories such as search and information costs, bargaining and execution costs, and post contractual guarantee or feedback costs.

The main purpose of this paper is to explore the conceptual framework of governance based on the institutional economic approach emphasizing the views of John Rogers Commons. To this end, as a qualitative  approach, the focus group of the research method was applied. According to Commons, we first encounter a conflict of interest between individuals, groups, and organizations, which is itself due to the scarcity of resources. Then, collective action is formed to overcome such contradictions. In view of that, there is negotiation, exchange, and collective bargaining that ultimately lead to working rules among human beings to come to a practical result as to live and work together under an agreement that engenders order, security, and dignity. Commons considers working rules as a major means for organizing societychr('39')s affairs; however, such working rules are formed and developed within the framework of collective democracy. Order and rules cannot be enforced and sustained unless the views and the voice of all parties and stakeholders are heard on an equal basis. Collective democracy as a method of governance facilitates the achievement of such a goal.

Institution is the collective action in control, liberation, and expansion of individual action; so that individuals are identified and realized through their participation in institutions. In the institutionalist perspective, the question of planning goes beyond the dichotomy of public-private sectors, and is transmuted from being an individual or interpersonal activity to an aspect of governance. Communicative action is the collective actions of the agents involved, that is coordinated through acts aiming to reach understanding and unanimity; hence, participants pursue their individual goals under the condition that they can harmonise their plans of action. Communicative planning approach is opposed to the imposition of top-down planning, and gives emphasis to the inclusion of all actors in the process of planning. This approach notices that communicative processes can help create consensus on critical social issues and foster the political will to bring about change. Exploring the content of the two mentioned approaches (institutionalism and communicative planning) indicates that despite the differences between these two schools of thought, both have distinct similarities; as they introduce ‘collective action’ as the basis for decision-making facing contradictory interests. This paper reviews and investigates the pertaining literature, and identifies the junctures of these approaches, with the emphasis on the role and position of collective action.

Today entrepreneurship has become one of the most important factors affecting economic development in many countries. However, it is very important to direct entrepreneurial actions toward productive activities. Baumol's theory of productive versus unproductive entrepreneurship highlights the role of institutional environment in directing entrepreneurial actions toward either productive, unproductive, or even destructive outcomes. So, to establish institutions that support productive entrepreneurship, it is necessary to find the means which have an impact on institutional and regulatory environment. Although many studies have been conducted based on Baumol's theory so far, only a small number of researches proposed solutions for establishment of legal and regulatory institutions required for the development of productive entrepreneurship. Hence, this study is aimed at proposing a synthesized theory derived from Baumol's theory of entrepreneurship and the theory of collective action. Our synthesized theory can be utilized as a rule-making approach to address this challenge. This synthesized theory highlights the role of both the government’s and entrepreneurs’ collective action in formation of regulatory and legal institutions which in turn can influence productive entrepreneurship. The proposed theory suggests that the order which is created upon the collective action can play an effective role in emergence and expansion of productive economic development.

Looking at the history of studies conducted in the framework of law and economics as long has always pointed to this approach. So that the whole studies carried out in this area, to be included multiple intellectual views. But the turning point of this study that provided the background for the development of this approach over the past, Published institutional economic ideas was in this field. The Commons is one of the founders of institutional economics is that for many years he attracted the attention of institutional ideas and influence of its own economists. The point of this paper is that what is Commons analytical approach to economic issues? Institutional glance what caused the difference in economic analysis? And what are the implications of his ideas in the field of law and economics? This paper is based on textual analysis for addressed this question. Commons with his unique vision of the concept of the institution in the form of collective action could change the economic analysis from the goods to exchange,brought a new approach, that can be as the approach mentioned exchange, to the scope of the knowledge of human. The emergence of economic Institutionalism and legal arguments exchange and costs, on the other hand, using economic methods to analyze the laws and regulations in recent decades, has made this field of study more than before. Due to the importance of the ideas of Commons in this area, the explanation and analysis of the article is based on his ideas. As a result, Commons approach is based on his idea about the prevalence of conflicts, trying lawmakers and courts to resolve these conflicts, the evolution of rights as a consequence of the ongoing processes of conflict resolution and the going concerns as a the context of exchange.

About hundred years ago, Walton Hamilton, in a historical event tried to introduce an alternative approach to economics, known as institutional economics. He intended to show that the institutional economics is an extensive and comprehensive scientific paradigm that could unite the whole economics. In fact, this school of thought well succeeded to rule over the prestigious universities of the world for some decades with the help of its founders and explainers. Commons, one of the founders of the institutional economics, trained great economists and for many years his institutional ideas ruled over Wisconsin University, one of the most prestigious universities of the time. This paper tries to answer such questions as follows: What was Commons’ analytical approach to economic issues and problems? What were the differences caused by his institutional perspective in conducting economic analyses? Like Veblen and Mitchell, Essentially what shortcomings did Commons assume in the mainstream economics that led him to found the institutional economics? What differences did Commons create in economic analyses and what subjects did he emphasize on? Specifically speaking, what transformations did his emphasis on the concept of transaction bring about in the principles of economics? Having a specific and different viewpoint, this paper uses a textual analysis to discuss these subjects in a try to show that Commons with his unique vision toward the concept of ‘institution’ could change the unit of economic analysis and was successful to introduce a new approach to this field of study, which might be referred to as ‘transactional approach’.