جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « ceo power » در نشریات گروه « اقتصاد »

The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of CEO power, political communication and social responsibility on the sensitivity of investing in cash in companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. To determine the extent of political communication, two criteria have been used, including government ownership and taxes paid. For this purpose, three (3) hypotheses have been developed to study this issue and the data related to 104 member companies of Tehran Stock Exchange for the period between 1390 and 1397 have been analyzed. The research regression model has been investigated and tested using a combined data method with an integrated approach. The results show that the power of the CEO has a negative and significant effect on the sensitivity of investing in cash, the criteria of political communication have a negative and significant effect on the sensitivity of investing in cash and social responsibility has a negative and significant effect on It has the sensitivity of investing in cash.

Nowadays, one of the topics that has been widely considered by financial researchers in relation to stock price behavior is sudden changes in stock prices. The aim of this study was to investigate the effect of CEO power on the risk of stock price falls with the role of moderator of the quality of accruals in companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. This research is correlational in nature and content. In this research, information about 142 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange, which have formed a statistical sample, has been analyzed in the period 1390-1390. The results of this model showed that the quality of accruals as a moderating variable has an effect on the relationship between CEO power and the risk of falling stock prices in companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. Also, the adjusted coefficient of determination of the model is 0.575. This means that the independent variables of the research model can explain 57.5% of the variance of the dependent variable risk of falling stock prices.

This study is supposed to investigate the relationship between CEO power and performance measurement. CEO tenure, management duality and board independence are the measures used to capture managerial power. Performance measurements are ROA, ROE and tobin's Q. 

It is expected that manager power have positive effect on performance. To test this hypothesis we used there hypotheses with the the CEO power as independent variable and and ROA, ROE and tobin's Q as dependent variable in each of them. Control variables used in this study are firm size, firm growth and firm age. We used data from 122 firms listed with the Tehran Stock Exchange from 2012 to 2020, collected from CODAL database. This is an applied research and has an experimental methodology. 

As was expected we found managerial power to be positively influencing ROE and Tobin's Q. To the contrary there is no relationship between manager power and ROA. 

Agency conflicts are the most important downside in the separation of ownership and management. An efficient way of reducing negative effects of this issue is to coordinate owner and manager interests through accounting variables. Shareholders prefer to have the highest return on their investment, namely ROE. As manager is employed by the board of directors, representing the owners, it is highly expected that there be an emphasis on owners' performance measures in manager contact, rather than other measures interesting to other stakeholders. Owners are willing to grant higher power to manager only if this higher power leads to improvement of owners' performance measures. The positive relationship found between manager power and ROE could verify this claim. Improvement in owners' interests is expected to influence positively their investment value proxied by Tobin's Q. Findings are indicative of this claim as well.