جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "export subsidies" در نشریات گروه "اقتصاد"

This paper focuses on strategic trade policy in the form of export subsidies in Cournot duopoly structure for differentiated goods. Export subsidies affect social welfare in both static and dynamic situations , and the aim of this paper is to analyze and compare the welfare effects of export subsidies in one-period and multi-period games in differentiated goods markets. To analyze the welfare effects of export subsidies, a two-stage game of complete but inperfect information is considered. In the first stage, two governments determine the amount of export subsidies and in the second stage, two firms determine the product level. The results show that, given that the firms’ competitiveness do not differ so much, export subsidies by both governments increase the firms’ profits and decrease social welfare of both countries. In an infinitely repeated game with different discount factors for both countries, and by adopting trigger strategy, we create some conditions, in which both governments commit free trade. However, if the competitiveness of one firm is so greater than the other, free trade using trigger strategy is not stable and the country with more competitive firm has incentive to deviate.