جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « Economic Institutions » در نشریات گروه « اقتصاد »

This paper seeks to explore the nonlinear association between liquidity indicators and debt repayment capacity in relation to asset returns. For this purpose, the Panel Smooth Transition Regression (PSTR) method was employed to examine the nonlinear impact of liquidity indicators (including the ratios of current assets to total deposits, total loans granted to total deposits, and total loans granted to total assets and debt payment capacity indicators (such as the debt ratio and interest coverage ratio) on asset returns from 2011 to 2020. The findings revealed a nonlinear effect of all calculated indicators on asset returns. The magnitude and manner of the independent variables' influence on asset returns varied at different levels, with noticeable distinctions in the effect before and after the threshold value of 1.0586. In light of these results, bank policymakers can strategically select an optimal liquidity level to enhance bank profitability based on asset returns.

The most important effect of the political institution on the economic institution is in respecting or not the market system, which can ultimately strengthen or weaken the economic growth. In oil countries, abundant rent of oil income for government shapes the economic incentives of the political institution in such a way that provides special interests through public resources. While in the free market, the pursuit of private interests will lead to public welfare. Such a different approach in some oil countries provides the context of limiting and continuous interfering in the market mechanism, so it leads to a decrease in economic growth. Due to the importance of determining the real exchange rate in achieving the desired economic growth, in this article attempt to investigate the impact of political institutions on economic growth in an oil country. The game theory method used to substantiate the presented concepts. In this regard, the different motivations of the policy makers (as political institutions) of the oil countries in determining the exchange rate investigated. The reaction of entrepreneurs to this policy in choosing the level of investment considered as an indicator of economic growth. Based on the results, ellits in motivation of maximizing government revenue determine the optimal exchange rate. Assuming economic competition, they tend to misalign exchange rate in order to weaken competitors. Adding the assumption of political competition will lead to higher exchange rate misalignment and further weaken economic growth.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of political regime types, including democracy and dictatorship, on the quality of economic institutions as the main variables in the formation of the economic growth process. The political power is distributed among a wide range of interest groups in mature democracies, while it is concentrated in the hands of the elected executive in initial democracies in a way that other groups are unable to participate in political power. In initial dictatorships, the political power is vested in one individual as well, but in mature dictatorships, it is divided among the members of the ruling group and the leader is limited in removing other members of the ruling coalition. The empirical results indicate that the economic institutions enjoy better quality in mature democracies and dictatorships compared to the initial democracies and dictatorships. Moreover, the economic institutions’ quality in mature dictatorships and democracies is not significantly different. The mature dictatorships have better protection of property rights compared to the initial democracies, despite the fact that they lack free elections. The results are robust to change the dependent variable, control variables, the sample, and using the instrumental variable approach.

Early economists have cited economic freedom as the basis for economic growth, and later economists have emphasized the role of inclusive political and economic institutions in creating and sustaining economic growth. The relationship between these two perspectives goes to the concept that the economic freedom shapes by economic institutions. Proper institutional of countries not only contributes to the growth and prosperity of their economies, but can also increase the power of countries in the face of economic shocks. Identifying the institutions’ situation of countries can help to adopt appropriate policies by governments and the private sector. In this study, by generalizing a structural model of Iran's economy as it includes the endogenous institutional function, attempt to measure the effects of effective shocks on the macroeconomic structure of the country with emphasis on institutional variables. The results show that the increase in oil shock has had a positive effect on the country's economic growth and institutions. This study had done for the period 1349-1399 by using GMM and Svar methods. The result of estimating the structural model shows that improvement of the institutional environment has affected most of the important variables of the Iran's economy, so improving the quality of institutions leads to increase in national product and reduces liquidity. Also, damaging institutional factors is related with increase in government size and inflation. Most of the impulses considered in the study had a significant effect on economic growth and institutional status of the country.

The issue of economic growth and identifying factors affect it has always been one of the interesting topics to economists. Extensive studies have identified the role of several factors in economic growth, but in modern models, these factors are function of incentives in societies. In these studies, the incentives that drive or slow economic growth attributes to the different political and economic institutions on those societies. This article by using game theory approach and designing different scenarios, will evaluate the different incentives that can influence the choice of size of government’s policy in the oil countries. At first, elites who seek to maximize government revenue intend to set a government size to maximize the production of middle-class entrepreneurs. Assuming that the government is active in economic activities, elites tend to increase the size of government. If the competition extend to the political arena, the motivation of the elites was strongly influenced, which would result in a larger government than previous scenarios and further weaken economic growth.

The weak economic performance of resource-rich countries results in the economic studies’ great concentration on the role of institutions in resource curse literature and employment of theoretical or empirical approaches to determine the cause of this phenomenon . In this paper, we argue that the two independent variables of political institutions and natural resources influence the economic institutions which are endogenous variables; by applying a descriptive-analytical approach and making distinction between function of “economic institutions” and “political institutions” . Political institutions form the political power structure to specify the elites’ scope of power in the establishment of favorable economic institutions, which aim at distributing the resources among the affiliated groups . We also use the empirical approach to show that natural resources do not have any significant effect on the quality of economic institutions by controlling the effect of political institutions . In contrast, the better quality of political institutions results in the better quality of economic institutions .