جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « خطای نوع دوم حسابرسی » در نشریات گروه « حسابداری »

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between real earnings management, aggressive real earnings management and audit quality. This study is practical in terms of purpose and type of correlation in terms of method. For this purpose, the number of 72 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (Number of 864 company-year observations) was examined in the period from 2009 to 2021 and the panel data regression model was used to test the hypotheses. The results of the study show that real earnings management has a positive and significant relationship with the second type audit errors. However, when examining aggressive real earnings management with the second type audit errors, no significant association was observed. Furthermore, there is a negative and significant relationship between real earnings management and aggressive real earnings management with the number of paragraphs in the auditor's and the qualified opinion. According to the results obtained, real earnings management leads to a decrease in audit quality, and in order to achieve their goals, managers use methods that are difficult for auditors to detect, and when auditors are unable to increase the audit effort in response, they demand a higher audit fee. The results of the study will lead to an expansion of literature in the area of real earnings management and audit quality.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between audit fee stickiness and audit error. For this purpose, a sample of 274 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange and OTC, for a period of 9 years 2012-2020 (1455 companies-year) and selected as an unbalanced panel have been selected. The hypotheses were also tested using multivariate regression. The results showed that with increasing adhesion in the upward correction as well as adhesion in the downward correction, the error of the second type of audit will not change significantly. However, less stickiness in the upward correction leads to a reduction in the conditional audit report and an increase in the quality of the audit. Less stickiness in downward correction is also positively associated with restatement of financial statements.However, less stickiness in the upward correction leads to a reduction in the conditional audit report and an increase in the quality of the audit. Less stickiness in downward correction is also positively associated with restatement of financial statements.

Predicting earnings management provides information about the expected earnings of any particular company and is a key aspect of disclosure. Managers, as the most knowledgeable of the current and future status of the company, pass on their information to outsiders, thereby reducing information asymmetry. On the other hand, based on the opportunistic approach, the manager predicts optimistic profits by using disclosure policies to avoid work problems and threatening loss of management credibility as well as financial problems during the financial crisis. However, auditors with greater independence and less collusion with the manager and the ability to detect distortions are better able to monitor management reports. In a time of financial crisis, optimistic earnings forecasts are limited. Much research has been done on predicting managers 'earnings, but so far the impact of audit quality on the relationship between managers' earnings forecasting and the financial crisis has not been addressed. Therefore, the present study examines managers' earnings forecast and financial crisis with emphasis on audit quality. In this regard, a sample of 109 companies listed in the Stock Exchange during the period 2011-2017 was selected and tested. The results using multivariate regression show that the financial crisis increases the optimistic forecast of management. However, audit quality with Type II error criteria does not affect the relationship between financial crisis and optimistic forecasting of managers.