جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "ceo characteristics" در نشریات گروه "حسابداری"

A solution must be devised to control the representation of managers in companies, ensure their responsibility and accountability, and protect the rights of shareholders. One of these strategies is compensation to motivate managers to achieve organizational goals. Corporate governance mechanisms are one of the factors affecting the managers' compensation. Therefore, this study investigates the relationship between three essential factors of corporate governance (ownership structure, characteristics of the board and chief executive officer (CEO)) and managers' compensation in companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2016. This research is practical in terms of purpose and descriptive in implementation. It is also in the correlation branch in terms of investigating the relationship between variables. Data are collected by literature method (reading books and articles) and referring to databases, that is, through the Rahvard Navin databases, as well as the websites belonging to the Tehran Stock Exchange Organization, the Kodal website, and the notes attached to the financial statements. Multiple linear regression and the least-squares method are used for statistical analysis. The results indicate no significant relationship between corporate governance mechanisms (ownership structure, board of directors' characteristics, CEO's characteristics) and managers' compensation. Therefore, all three research hypotheses that corporate governance mechanisms have a significant relationship with managers' compensation are not confirmed. These results are consistent with the research results of Jaiswal and Bhattacharya (2016) and Abedini et al. (2015), who stated that there is no evidence of a significant relationship between the characteristics of the board of directors and the remuneration of managers. It is also in line with the research results of Hassan et al. (2015), who stated that ownership structure has no significant relationship with managers' compensation. The results of the research are inconsistent with the research of Ahmedpour and Javan (2014), Haiderpour et al. (2016), Abedini et al. (2015), and Jaiswal and Bhattacharya (2016).  Results are not far from expected because, on the one hand, the reluctance of CEOs and members of the board of directors of companies to provide information on managers' bonuses, as well as the lack of a valid law to disclose information related to managers' compensation, has caused a lack of access to accurate and transparent information. On the other hand, the largest percentage of ownership of stock exchange companies belongs to public government institutions or government-affiliated institutions. Unfortunately, in public companies, managers' remuneration is not in reality (the remuneration is not based on managers' performance). In contrast, in private companies, the remuneration is based on performance. In addition, there is no independent committee called the Compensation Committee, which has a specific mechanism for determining compensation in companies listed on the Tehran stock exchange. In general, what is clear in research related to managers' compensation in Iran is the lack of accurate and transparent information about the amount of compensation awarded to managers and board members and the amount of cash and non-cash compensation. These issues indicate a shortcoming in the corporate governance system. This research's most important practical suggestion is to oblige companies to form a compensation committee. Because its lack, which increases transparency and accountability for managers' compensation, is strongly felt. Although managers' compensation is one of the most important corporate governance principles, it has not been taken seriously in Iran for some reasons, and some companies refuse to disclose the total amount of compensation. Therefore, it is necessary to research the non-disclosure of managers' compensation in detail.

Internal controls play a vital role in prevention of fraud. Internal controls reduce the opportunities for committing fraud. According to information symmetry theory, internal control disclosure the solution is to examine the role of management accountability. To investigate the subject, based on the probit regression model the data related to the variables is analyzed the period from 2013 to 2019. The results showed that there is a significant relationship between the internal controls weakness in financial reporting and the detection of fraud in future. It was also found that the continuity of internal control weakness has a significant positive impact on the relationship between internal control weakness in financial reporting and fraud detection in the future. Finally, there was no empirical evidence on the effect of management characteristics on the relationship between internal control weakness in financial reporting and future fraud detection.

The purpose of this study is To investigate the effect of CEO influence on the relationship between gender composition in board members and the cost of debt of companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. The present study is an applied research booklet in terms of purpose. In terms of the nature of the research, it is part of the review research. In terms of the nature of the data, it is a small research booklet. In order to know the research booklet, it was a semi-experimental method. This method is used when it is not possible to select a company at random or it is not possible to completely manipulate or interfere with independent variables. In terms of descriptive method a) It is a correlational study that multivariate regression has been used. In terms of descriptive method, b) is also a booklet of post-event research. In terms of the type of argument, it is a booklet of deductive-inductive research. In terms of dimension, time is a retrospective research pamphlet. In terms of research duration, it is part of the combined method. The statistical population of the present study is the companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. After removing the restrictions, 128 companies were selected as a statistical sample. The study period is between the years 2013 to 2019. Managers also come to the field to create a large unit in the economy and according to the instructions of Article 1 of the Applied Commerce Law in Iran, companies whose type of obligations are defined in the law and the amount of capital based on its founders or a proportion based on public contributions are formed. Therefore, we seek to investigate the effect of CEO influence on the relationship between gender composition in board members and the debt cost of companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. The results of testing the first hypothesis indicate that there is a direct and significant relationship between gender composition in board members and debt cost. In other words, it can be said that with the increase of gender composition in the members of the board of directors, the cost of debt also increases. Also, based on the test of the second hypothesis, it is stated that the CEO's permeability modulates the relationship between the gender composition of the board members and the cost of the company's debt.

In line with the sustainable growth and development of countries, paying attention to the growth of organizations is one of the policies of all managers, and banks are no exception. Banks should be managed by managers who can increase the value of the company; However, some banks do not seem to comply strictly with these requirements, which may explain the inexperience of some banks. Executives make inappropriate structural capital decisions that make capital structure decisions inefficient. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of CEO characteristics such as CEO duality, CEO preference and CEO gender diversity on the performance of banks listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. The statistical population of all banks listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange is between 1390 and 1398, which was examined using linear regression and the results of hypothesis testing showed that the characteristics of the CEO have a significant effect on bank performance and banks perform better than male managers. Also, the high experience of managers has improved the performance of banks, which indicates that managers should be given the opportunity to show their true performance, and the higher their work experience, the better the performance of banks, and in addition, this research showed That the dead have better performance in managing the banks better and can improve the performance of the bank.

This study examines the effect of managerial mechanisms of corporate governance (board and CEO characteristics) on risk taking of Iranian firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange. Risk taking proxy is idiosyncratic risk (unsystematic risk). Board and CEO characteristic proxies are board independence, board size, CEO duality, CEO tenure and CEO dominance. We used standard deviation of the residual return explained by the Fama-French (1993) three - factor model as a surrogate for idiosyncratic risk. Also we used Leverage, ROA and AGE as control variables. Using a collected sample of 127 listed companies of Tehran Stock Exchange during 2008 - 2013 and using panel data regression, our empirical evidences show that board independence, board size and CEO dominance are associated with idiosyncratic risk, whereas other variables have no influence on idiosyncratic risk.