جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « To cause » در نشریات گروه « علوم انسانی »

After Darwin's theory, the teleological argument from design faced numerous challenges and transformations to the extent that it could no longer explain order according to modern science, as the final cause was unable to account for Darwin's theory. In fact, there was a need for an argument from nature that could, in line with the transformation of Aristotelian natural philosophy, explain the existence of order and its connection to the creator of order within empirical sciences. This is because the teleological intent in Aquinas's argument from design, based on the final cause, suggested the will of an intelligent agent behind the world. But it seemed, the theory of evolution - understanding nature through the "efficient cause" – has rendered this transcendental intelligence unnecessary. Thus, the teleological argument from design failed to align with modern science and gradually, its application to the existence of God was deemed unscientific and unnecessary. Therefore, it is necessary to articulate order in such a manner and utilize it differently in theology and in the defense of theism, so that the empirical order of the world continues to necessitate the existence of God. In reality, it can be shown that the efficient naturalistic order is the only common point between monotheism and atheism that cannot be effective in attributing to the existence or non-existence of God. It is necessary to refine and complete this natural order in defense of theism. Based on this, the teleological argument from design remains significant in its own right.

Islamic philosophers consider man as "agent-by-intention" in his voluntary actions, performing bodily acts with the motive of achieving an ultimate purpose. The mental existence of this purpose is seen as the final cause of the action. This study, based on library resources and using analytical, rational argumentation and introspection methods, elucidates the stages and principles of voluntary action. According to this research, the final cause of voluntary action is the agent's love for the goal rather than its mental existence. The primary aim of the agent in voluntary action is to achieve the goal associated with it. However, since this goal cannot be realized without performing the action, the love for the goal, as the final cause, renders the action leading to it desirable and prompts the agent to undertake it. The goal of the action may also serve as a prelude to achieving a higher goal, and its desirability will be dependent on the desirability of the subsequent goal. In voluntary actions, there are multiple sequential purposes, and the desirability of each goal depends on the desirability of the resulting outcome. Due to the impossibility of an infinite regress in real causes, the series of sequential final causes of an action, i.e., the agent's sequential love for each action and its resulting outcome, must ultimately end at the first final cause. Introspection of the voluntary agent and rational argumentation show that this fundamental love is the agent's love for himself and his perfections.

Ibn Sina's views on induction are considered among the most accurate, not only among Muslim philosophers but also among early philosophers in general. This renowned Iranian philosopher critiqued Aristotle's theory of induction while still working within the Aristotelian framework. Through his scholarly critique, he exposed its limitations. He then introduced the concept of experience in a precise manner and combined induction with a hidden analogy to address the problem of achieving certainty through induction. However, he recognized that this certainty could not be absolute. Therefore, Ibn Sina sought to determine the conditions for obtaining certainty. He showed that certainty derived from experience is conditional, achievable only under specific circumstances. The first premise of his hidden analogy is the ‘Random Rule’ (qaʿidat al-ittifaqi), which has been subject to much criticism. One of the most significant criticisms concerns the empirical nature of the Random Rule. This article will first explain Ibn Sina's perspective. It will then examine Khwajah Nasir's views on experience and induction. By drawing on Khwajah Nasir's ideas, the article will present a rational analysis of the Random Rule, demonstrating that it can be explained rationally using the principle of causality and is not merely an empirical rule.

The principle of agency is the ontological foundation of Masha's philosophy and it seems that the interpretation of Sinavi's agential causation is in the existential relationship between all supreme principles and subaltern beings, such as the ontological relationship between the burden of transcendence and the system of creation and the existential relationship between the single human sou l. And its powers have been the influence of passage. The causality based on the causality between the causes and causal factors completely excludes the substantive relationship and the plurality of isolation between these objective facts and proves the doubt and existential difference between them. Of course, according to the macro-ontological rules of agency, it is necessary to have non-alien variables of cause and effect, and it makes supreme principles non-alien and non-alien from their causes and gives relational existence to the causes. In this way, the personal unity of the existence of the cause and the multiplicity of the quality of the effect cannot be proven in Sinavi's wisdom, but a kind of constructive unity, meaning the unity of existence and the existing multiplicity, can be found in some of the ontological topics such as theology and anthropology of him and his co-thinkers.

The discussion of causation in general and the discussion of the mu`iddih cause is one of the important and path-breaking topics of ontology, which can play a significant role in correct understanding in theology, cosmology, and anthropology. Despite all this, the problem of the mu`iddih cause has been less analyzed and sometimes it is satisfied with a vague definition of it. This ambiguity has turned the mu`iddih cause into a brief answer in many cases. Going through this formal definition and analyzing what exactly is the mu`iddih cause? It can be the basis for deep understanding and solving many problems, such as the doubt of the conflict between science and religion. Because the causes that the sciences investigate and seek to deny or prove are of this kind, and a cause such as vajib al-vujud, which is discussed in religious debates, is one causing existence. In this research, with the method of rational analysis, the definitions given of the mu`iddih cause have been examined, the defects and shortcomings of each have been shown, and it has been found that the mu`iddih cause when not meaning the presence and lack of preceding necessary and path of grace, it is the factor that prepares the matter, creates the capability in the capable and prepare it to receive grace of grace-giver.

Sheikh Ahmad Ahsaei, as the leader of the sheikhiyah, has independently stated the claim of imams as the active cause in the creation system and has drawn important active roles as the results of considering them as the active cause, among these roles is the creation of beings, feeding creatures, reviving the death, causing people to die, and auditing the servants in the Day of Judgment; Also, Ahsaei considered obedience and worship possible through and for the innocent, and listed them as examples of worship. The analysis and verification of the claims of the leader of sheikhiyah has been the problem of this research and in this research, his points of view have been analyzed and it was revealed that his claims do not have a valid document and his perceptions of the verses and traditions are based on his own taste, and on the other hand, it is against the beliefs of Imami great scholars.

One of the indisputable principles of jurisprudence and law is the need to compensate the damages caused to others. If the damage is caused by nonperformance of contractual obligations, the basis of the lawsuit are the rules of contractual liability and if there is no agreement between the parties, the rules of tort will prevail over the relations between the parties. According to the general rules, proving the elements of tort is necessary and incumbent on the injured party. One of the evidences for proving a claim is an oath, and one of the types of oath is a decisive oath, which, if the conditions are met and the relevant rules are observed, can be invoked in a civil liability lawsuit to prove the elements of the claim. In cases where the infliction of bodily or financial damage is caused by alternative causes, sometimes the injured party does not have the ability and requirement evidences to prove the causation and the probability of taking an oath and playing a role is much higher than other cases. The method of this research is descriptive-analytical. Regarding the role of decisive oath in proof of causation, there are many different opinions that it seems appropriate that taking an oath by the defendant or the accused as the cause of the termination of the causation and his innocence and, in the end, if a person cannot be held liable for damages, it must be ordered to pay damages from the public budget.

Attribution in civil responsibility, especially when several factors are involved in the occurrence of losses, is one of the important issues that has always been the subject of debate and opinion. The purpose of this article is to investigate the attribution of civil liability in Iranian law with a view to American law. This article is descriptive and analytical. The materials and data are also qualitative and data collection has been used.Ethical Considerations: In this article, the originality of the texts, honesty and trustworthiness are observed. In Iranian law, the attribution of civil liability is determined based on longitudinal and transverse causes and according to the impact of each factor. In American law, however, based on the principle of proportional cause, on the basis of custom, the role of the cause of loss and damage is determined based on the element of knowledge regarding the occurrence of damage. Based on the principle of proportional cause, it is possible to identify the role of each cause by relying on custom, and the cause that has the main effect on the result can be held responsible. There is a lot of similarity in Iranian and American laws regarding the attribution of civil liability. In American law, the basis of fault is used to assign civil responsibility, and on the other hand, in American law, there are different degrees of fault, and based on these degrees of fault, the amount of responsibility and compensation of the guilty person is calculated and evaluated, while in Iranian law, the degree of fault is in the amount Responsibility is not effective.

The relationship between credit and economic growth is one of the issues discussed by economists and recent studies have shown that the relationship between credit and economic growth can be nonlinear. The aim of this study was to investigate the nonlinear Granger causality between the credit variable (which is the most important criterion for financial development) and the economic growth variable. For this purpose, Granger causality in the form of MSVAR model and seasonal data in the period 1383: 1 to 1398: 4 have been used. The results show a nonlinear relationship between economic growth and validity and MSVAR model has better explanatory power than its linear competitor (VAR model). According to this study, in regime one (which corresponds to periods of positive economic growth and high credit growth), causality exists only in terms of economic growth to credit, and in regime two (which corresponds to periods of economic growth and low credit growth) Causality is from credit to economic growth. In other words, in periods of prosperity, an increase in credit cannot significantly boost economic growth, and due to credit constraints in bad economic conditions, an increase in credit can affect economic growth

When the parties enter into agreements in the contract, the obligations arise and the agreements may not be implemented as expected by the parties, in which case there are damages from breach of contract. Compensation requires determining the extent of compensable damages, foreseeability of damage is a criterion for determining the extent of damages. In Iranian law, influenced by fiqh sources, there are two sources for determining the liability: usurpation and opposability, damages resulting from a breach of contract are not separate from the opposability, The relationship of legal causality, which requires a proportionality between damages and breach of contract, which justifies by foreseeability of damage. This kind of approach is contrary to the originality of the contractual liability, which considers the provisions of the contract time as a criterion for determining the extent of damages. There is no provision in Iranian law that determines certain characteristics for the ability to predict damage in contract law. In French and English law, the contractual responsibility is predicted and in French civil law and the English judicial procedure explicitly the time of the contract is unique unless it has a deliberate intention to violate its obligations.

In crimes against persons through indirect cause, the perpetrator does not directly cause bodily harm. Rather, it provides an instrument to commit a crime. In these crimes, unlike some legal systems that consider fault to be necessary in order to verify the link between the causal behavior and physical injuries, in Imami jurisprudence, the main criterion is "odvan". "Odvan" can be defined as an illegal behavior by extrapolating the existing partial rulings about the causes of responsibility from jurisprudence books. Hereto two general rules regarding the role of "odvan" in such crimes could be explained. First, the rule of "non-responsibility of the owner in his property except with proof of odvan". Second, the rule of "responsibility of the perpetrator in other than his own property, except by removers of the responsibility". Islamic Penal Code, in the sixth chapter of the Book of Diyat, about the causes of responsibility is satisfied of translating the related issues and rulings from jurisprudence books in the form of partial rulings, and it has not paid attention to the role of odvan in crimes. In this research, an attempt has been made to revise the relevant general rules with the analytical descriptive method and to provide a scientific basis for solving this legal deficiency.

The issue of cosmos occurrence has always been one of the most essential philosophical topics. This topic was so many important for Proclus as well as the other philosophers. This paper has tried to make clear his special point of view about this topic by analyzing his fundamental ideas. The most important platonic cosmological concept is The Demieurgous, and this paper has analyzed Proclus' comment of Demieurgous and creation of material world.

Causality as an existential cause serves as a basis for Avicenna’s philosophy and is one of the vital principles of philosophical and rational problems. As a rationalist philosopher, Avicenna has proposed some new insights including the idea that causality is based on existence. Proposing the distinction between existence and essence, he has provided a new model for the God-world relationship. He believes that the relationship between the creator and the created can be explained by examining the causality relationship. Among different causes, he prioritizes the efficient cause (Agent) which makes things exist out of nothing. As to the God-world relationship explanation, he argues that God governs the world of beings as the cause of causes. As for its existence and non-existence, the Being as the effect and the possible (non-aseity) needs a preponderance (Murajjih) that is the cause of causes. Avicenna believes that God’s essential aseity entails God’s necessitated existence. Not only he defines the dependency of the caused on the cause as “the necessity by virtue of another” (Wujub Bilghair) or existential possibility in Sadra’s words, but he emphasizes the existential relationship between the caused and the cause. Then he opens a clearer horizon towards the primacy of being which had a great impact on Islamic philosophers as well as Western philosophers like Thomas Aquinas.

The present study seeks to compile the Causes affecting the strategic management of the Football Federation of the Islamic Republic of Iran. From this perspective, the research data using a qualitative research approach and Delphi study, with the formation of a 13-member Delphi panel of experts in the field of football Sport and At the academic and executive level, who were selected using purposive or judgmental sampling; Through a semi-structured interview or Semistandard (in the first round of Delphi) and a closed questionnaire (in the second to fourth rounds of Delphi); Was collected. Research data using thematic analysis and the network of themes type in the first round of Delphi and Kendall’s Coefficient of concordance (W) to achieve the final consensus of experts on the importance of Causes affecting the strategic management of the Football Federation of the Islamic Republic of Iran Used in subsequent rounds. In order to validate the Qualitative findings, the validity method of communication and the audit method have been used, and for the reliability of the Qualitative findings, the method of reproducibility and transferability or generalizability has been used. Results of research in four Delphi rounds have shown that the Causes affecting the strategic management of the Football Federation of the Islamic Republic of Iran consist of Causes: structural (macro) with 10 variables, organizational (medium) with 9 variables and action (micro) with 1 variable. Therefore, it is important to develop a strategic document, pay attention to privatization, creating regulatory mechanisms, pay attention to professionalism

Since long ago, the methodology of philosophy has had different angles in the thought of the researchers of philosophy, one of the deep layers of which can be considered Allameh Tabatabai’s theory of ‘Methodological Restriction of Philosophy’, in ‘a posteriori argument in general concomitance’. This study elaborates the foundations of this thought through a descriptive and analytical method, and criticizes its opposing views. It aims at studying the direct effect of Allameh Tabatabai’s philosophical foundations on his methodology, and emphasizes that in view of the congruence of his basis and innovative method there is no objection to Allameh’s presentation of this theory. The importance of examining and verifying Allameh’s theory in this way becomes clear when we know that the students of philosophy, in dealing with this theory, face opposing views from the very beginning and do not reflect on the philosophical foundations of this methodology. However, more and closer reflection shows that the foundations of transcendental wisdom do not yield a method other than Allameh’s suggested method, and if the critics do not accept this method, they will confront with basic problems.

Basics in various sciences have the authority of confirmative principles and subject principles. The purpose of this article is to investigate the role of four elements in the plant biology of the Islamic period. This research will be done using the library method based on historical studies with an analytical approach. The hypothesis of this research emphasizes that the four elements are the material cause, which has been inference for the first time in this article. The findings obtained from the examination of original historical sources show that there are four elements in two fields of botany, including plant biology and plant conditions. Because four elements are present in a plant and each one has a specific task, it is necessary to analyze the faculties of the plant into four elements (Earth, water, air, & fire) that have four qualities (warmth, coldness, wetness, dryness). Also, the cause for the differences and discrepancies in plants is related to the difference in the composition of four elements in them, and the conditions and parts of plants are also explained based on the four element system.

Inconclusive cause is regarded as a topic with relevance in both civil and criminal law, with its application in areas where the perpetrator of the damage is unknown. Findings of this study, which have been conducted through the practical-analytical method of research, show that 4 views related to distribution of responsibility exist; First, neither is responsible since fault of no-one can be proven. Second, they have shares responsibility. Another view places the responsibility on the State, and the damages are payable via insurance funds or public funds (Bait-al-Maal). Based on the findings of another view, emphasises on balloting (lot), which was also accepted in the previous Islamic Penal Code of Iran. In French law, if the plaintiff has filed lawsuit against a group under the principle of error, the jurisprudence does not base the liability of each member of group, but takes into account their collective error. In Iranian Civil Liability Code, partaking in a group, a member of which has conducted an error result in shared responsibility for all members of that group.

A scrutiny of Fārābī’s works reveals that one of his major concerns and a key philosophical problem in his view was God as the origin of other existing entities as well as His attributes and His relation with the world of being. As a founder of Islamic philosophy, in his efforts to establish the intellectual system of Islamic philosophy, Fārābī not only takes the study of God as a metaphysical problem, but also considers it as a key central problem in metaphysics. Indeed, in most of his works, he defines metaphysics in terms of God (the First Existent: al-mawjūd al-awwal) as the study of the First Existent and the study of other existents in that they are caused by the First Existent. Accordingly, in Fārābī’s view, the First Existent is an entity on which other existents depend in their existence, and in fact, other existents deserve to be studied in metaphysics just in virtue of their relation to it. For this reason, it is the most significant and central issue in the study of Fārābī to research into the First Existent and its attributes as well as its relation with other existents. A scrutiny of Fārābī’s view of the First Existent will give us an understanding of the main metaphysical problem in his philosophy, which is crucial to an understanding of other problems of metaphysics as well as the entire system of his intellectual doctrines. Additionally, a major offshoot of this is a more accurate understanding of the relation between Fārābī’s theology (study of God) and Avicenna’s theology, which results in an enhanced study of Avicenna’s philosophy. Accordingly, the main problem tackled in this article is an analysis of Fārābī’s view of God and His attributes.In this way, the article is chiefly concerned with a study of God as the First Existent and His attributes from Fārābī’s perspective. However, since Fārābī’s theological studies largely appear in his Ārāʾ ahl al-madīnat al-fāḍila (Opinions of the citizens of the virtuous city) and al-Siyāsat al-madaniyya (Urban politics), this article focuses on these two works, although it also reviews the rest of Fārābī’s works when they involve a reference to the problem at hand. It is necessary to note that this article overviews and analyzes Fārābī’s views in terms of his own intellectual context and only draws on the jargons prevalent in the works that are attributed to him beyond any reasonable doubt.

In many parts of his works, Fārābī discusses theological issues, but a large part of his theological studies appears in two of his works: Ārāʾ ahl al-madīnat al-fāḍila (Opinions of the citizens of the virtuous city) and al-Siyāsat al-madaniyya (Urban politics). The jargons Fārābī uses to refer to God include the “First” (awwal), the “First Existent,” and the “First Cause” (al-sabab al-awwal). Unlike Avicenna, he does not believe that God is the essentially necessary existent. Fārābī ascribes several names and attributes to the First Existent, in particular its being immemorial and the most perfect. These attributes encompass other divine attributes. Indeed, other attributes ultimately refer to these two. Fārābī explains that although multiple names and attributes apply to the First Existent, this does not add up to the multiplicity of the First Existent, because it includes all those attributes in its essential unity. In Fārābī’s view, when common names are predicated of the First Existent and other existents, they are not predicated by way of univocity (or a common meaning: al-ishtirāk al-maʿnawī). Moreover, because of a resemblance and relation between the First Existent and other existents, the predication is not by way of equivocity (or a vebal commonality: al-ishtirāk al-lafẓī) either. It is indeed a different variety of predication by which common names are predicated of the First Existent and other existents not as univocal, but by virtue of a sort of relation and resemblance and in terms of priority and posterity. This resemblance or relation between the attributes of the First Existent and those of other existents provides us with some kind of knowledge about the First Existent, by which we apply positive attributes to it.Fārābī explains the relation between the First Existent and other existents in terms of the theory of emanation (fayḍ). While he was influenced by neo-Platonic philosophers, particularly Plotinus, and despite his ample influence on Avicenna, there are significant ways in which Fārābī can be distinguished from them to the extent that the theories of emanation put forward by each had better be treated as three separate views. Fārābī’s theory is distinguished from Plotinus’s mainly by his introduction of heavenly spheres into the flow of emanation, the multiplicity and number of intellects, and the possibility of human knowledge of the First Existent and the First Existent’s knowledge of other existents. Furthermore, his theory is discriminated from Avicenna’s by his rejection of accommodating essential necessity and essential possibility in his theory of emanation. Since Fārābī did not even consider the principle of essential necessity and possibility, he does not account for emanation in terms of essential and non-essential necessity or possibility. Although Avicenna was influenced by Fārābī’s theory of emanation, his view is far away from Fārābī’s because he explains emanation in terms of necessity and possibility. It should be noted, however, that Avicenna’s theory is so dominant that, at first sight, it seems impossible to be able to explain emanation without the key elements of necessity and possibility. The main contribution of the present research is the study of Fārābī’s authentic views of God based on the works that are attributed to him beyond any reasonable doubt, and without any mixture with dubious works attributed to him. Accordingly, it turns out that, despite his great influence on Avicenna, Fārābī’s view diverges from Avicenna’s on many key issues such that it seems that they present two distinct intellectual frameworks.

Fārābī believes that God is the origin of all existents, hence His appellation as the First, the First Existent, and the First Cause. In Fārābī’s view, the First Existent is not only an entity on which other existents depend in their existence, but also an entity in relation to which they deserve to be studied in metaphysics. A scrutiny of the First Existent and its attributes as well as its relation to other existents is a major research question in the study of Fārābī’s philosophy. Since there are doubts about the attribution of some works to Fārābī, and those works provide a distinct intellectual framework relative to his definitive works, this article aims to derive and overview Fārābī’s authentic views. According to definitive works by Fārābī, God is not a necessary existent, and the theory of emanation he puts forward as an explanation of the relation between the First Existent and other existents is not based on essential necessity and possibility. For this reason, his view of God is fundamentally different from that of his successor Avicenna.

Aristotle's discussions about Tuche (Τύχη) or fortune have obvious contradictions in two domains of ontology and axiology. In the domain of ontology, he has testified to the existence of fortune as a cause by accident- a cause by accident for an event which has occurred out of a choice based on thought and for a given intention. Aristotle believes that fortune-based affairs are subjects of intention and intellection which emerge from those agents who can take volitional actions. At the same time, he introduced fortune as an anti-rule and instable affair with indeterminate and purposeless causes. He accepted the existence of fortune even in the domain of the actions related to Techne and human happiness. However, he does not attach any value to it in axiology and declares it to be a cause by accident that comes after nature and intellect, even believing that there is no knowledge for it. Moreover, it is valueless in the domain of the action related to human happiness.

The rule "There is No Effect on the Existence Except Allah" is emphasized by the Ash'arites and Mulla Sadra. But each has offered a different interpretation of this rule; According to this rule, the Ash'arites have denied any causation, influence, or effect among the possibilities, and attribute all actions exclusively and directly to God Almighty. But Mulla Sadra, based on his philosophical principles in transcendent wisdom, while proving the near activity of God for all actions, also accepts a role for other possibilities in actions and proves a kind of influence and effect among the obligatory sub-transcendence. In this article, with a descriptive-analytical-critical method, both views in this regard were examined. Accordingly, neither view is flawed. Of course, Mulla Sadra's view, with the explanation given by Mullah Ali Modarres, is largely free from problems.