جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "lobbying" در نشریات گروه "پزشکی"

  While anyone can lobby governments, most lobbying is driven by commercial interests. Due to limited government disclosures, it is often challenging to get a clear picture of who is lobbying whom or why. To help make lobbying more visible to the public, we set out to develop a framework of key criteria for best practice government lobbying disclosures. 

  We undertook a systematic scoping review of peer-reviewed and grey literature to identify frameworks for measuring or evaluating lobbying transparency. We screened the titles and abstracts of 1727 peer-reviewed and 184 grey literature articles, assessing 230 articles for eligibility. Following screening, we included 15 frameworks from six peerreviewed and nine grey literature articles in our review. To create our framework of lobbying disclosures, we thematically coded the 15 included frameworks and used an iterative process to synthesise categories.

The 15 frameworks covered more than only lobbying disclosures, with the most common other theme about enforcement and compliance. Most frameworks were developed to evaluate lobbying transparency in particular jurisdictions, with the United States the most common. Of the 15 frameworks analysed, those developed by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) focused mainly on improving lobbying regulations, while most peer-reviewed studies developed frameworks to measure, compare and evaluate lobbying regulations. We developed a Framework fOr Comprehensive and Accessible Lobbying (FOCAL). It comprised eight primary categories (scope, timeliness, openness, descriptors, revolving door, relationships, financials, and contact log) covering 50 total indicators.

Government transparency plays a crucial role in facilitating access to information about commercial political activities like lobbying. Our framework (FOCAL) offers a template for policy-makers to develop or strengthen regulations to improve lobbying transparency so commercial political influence strategies are more visible and subject to public scrutiny. This is an important step towards rebalancing influence toward the public interest.

A growing evidence base indicates that sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) taxes are an effective tool to help reduce excess sugar intake. The effects of SSB taxes and the mechanisms which underlie them, however, are dependent on a number of interrelated factors such as policy design and responses of industry and consumers. Forde and colleagues contribute to unpacking these mechanisms by exploring the way in which the UK’s Soft Drinks Industry Levy (SDIL) shaped the four Ps of soft drinks marketing: product, price, placement, and promotion. This commentary builds on the authors’ insights by connecting them to existing knowledge on corporate political activity and the commercial determinants of health (CDOH) more broadly. Specifically, I discuss the risk that an industry framing of regulation-induced marketing changes as a voluntary step towards corporate responsibility undermines the need for government intervention to address obesity in other contexts and countries. I conclude by arguing that the public health community would benefit from considering marketing responses to regulation alongside industry narratives about these changes.