A defense of the meaning-based approach to the identification of the criterion for the logical truth.

In this article، I will at first explain the meaning-based theory of Davidson and the manner of its application in the identification of the criterion for the logical truth. To achieve this end I will refer to the Principles of lexical axioms and the principles of Phrasal axioms along with their applications in Davidson’s theory. In order to criticize Davidson''s theory، Evans selects the extentional attributive adjectives and shows that through employing a certain Kind of interpretation، one can make a meaning based theory in which the extentional attributive adjectives can appear in the phrasal axioms; therefore these principles cannot identify the extention of logical constants. To answer Evans criticism; I will use the concept of the violence of the basic linguistic intuition which Davidson uses that in replying to Foster. To this end، I will show that in spite of their superficial differences the criticisms proposed by Foster and Evans have basic origins. In the conclusion part of this article، I refer to the impossibility of reducing the semantic features of language to its syntactic qualities.