A Couple of Semantic Suppositions and Some Arguments for " The Principality of Being": A Critical Survey

Transcendental philosophers due to a number of reasons have defended “principality of existence”. Moreover aforementioned theory is grounded on some pre-assumptions. Hence critical encounter with this theory may be formulated in two main ways involving (i) scrutiny of pre-assumptions and (ii) checking the reasons which are presented for the theory. For a critical survey of pre-assumptions of “principality of existence”، “semantic synonymy of being” seems to be a semantic assumption which is quite wrong or at best، heavily under doubt. Also a specific understanding of words “ideationality” (ʼiʻtibāriyyat) and “quiddity” are among those concepts behind the theory which are quite vague. In order to give critical survey of arguments held for “principality of being”، it seems that the reason raised from “driving quiddity out from equivalence state by existence” which is assumed to be the best reason held for the theory، to be invalid. Beside these faults which one may call them “super structure” faults، there are some “infra structure” faults، among them are: the dominant duality naming “principality of existence” or “principality of quiddity” restricts the reality in existence or quiddity without mentioning any sufficient reason supporting that claim.