Anthropic Principle and its Role in Cosmological Fine-Tuning Argument: A Review and Critique of Views

The primary aim of the current paper is to critically examine the Standard Objection to a new revision of Design Argument. It refers to an epistemic challenge based on a philosophical interpretation of the Anthropic Principle (AP)، i. e. Anthropic Objection (AO) to the Cosmological Fine-Tuning Argument (CFTA). According to AO، being surprised by observing the Life-Permitting Universe (LPU)، which has a very low antecedent probability، is improper، because human cannot find himself in a universe which is not compatible with his existence. The argument، therefore، is accused to infer results that arise from the Observation Selection Effect (OSE) and has no other value. To respond to this objection، we point out and clarify two mistakes: first، an epistemological one، and second، a methodological one. First، we will show that AO is rooted in Hume’s criticism of Analogical Design Argument (ADA)، according to which the source of abstraction of the notion of Design is a kind of illusion. We claim that AP is not tautological or trivial، but rather it is verifiable، and corresponds to reality and state of affairs. Secondly، we argue that stepping out from Argument from Design to Argument to Design is a methodological mistake committed by Elliott Sober. Finally، we defend the rationality of CFTA against the Standard Objection