An Examination and Explanation of the Theory of Motion in Immaterial Beings

Many Islamic philosophers hold that it is impossible for immaterial beings to have motion. Their arguments for this claim are based on the principle that matter is a condition for motion. In this paper I seek to explain the nature of motion and then show that according to the theory of substantial motion, the existence of matter is doubtful and the arguments for the existence of matter or hyle—such as the argument from potentiality and actuality and the argument from attachment and detachment—are problematic. In this case we should revise our definition of immaterial beings. One move is to say that a being is immaterial if it does not have a position and space, since its definition should be such that both proponents and opponents of hyle might share. Moreover, if we deny hyle, we cannot talk about the concomitance of matter and potentiality. On the other hand, I will review and criticize five rational arguments for the immobility of the immaterial beings followed by some evidence from religious texts, and I shall show that these arguments are not sound enough. Therefore, I think that the motion of immaterial beings is possible and there is also evidence from religious texts to this effect.