Knowledge and Mental Existence; A Pluralist Interpretation of Mulla Sadra's View

According to a strong version of the theory of «mental existence»، this theory includes three main cl 1. Perception implies the existence of an idea in the mind of the subject; 2. the reality of the perception is nothing but the mental idea and 3. this mental idea corresponds the external perceived object. In this paper، I shall examine an interpretation of Sadra''s view which accepts the first claim while rejecting the second. This interpretation، presented by Javadi Amoli، draws a distinction between the existence of perception and the mental existence of the perceived object. Before this examination، I explore two similar views proposed before Mulla Sadra by Fakhr al-Din Al-Razi and al-Qushchi. Fakhr al-Din Al-Razi، though believing in the mental ideas، thinks that the reality of perception consists in the relation between the mind and the external world. According to Qushchi، the reality of the perception is an immanent entity in the mind which is different from what possesses the mental existence. The final conclusion of this paper is that all these three views encounter serious philosophical challenges.