A Rediscovery of the Nature of Virtues With a View on Linda Zagzebski's Theory

'Virtue' and 'vice' are common terms in moral philosophy and applied ethics about the nature of which there has been a lot of discussion. In recent decades, with the reemergence of virtue ethics and the introduction of virtue theory in epistemology, it has become much more important to rediscover the notion, as some epistemologists have engaged in the analysis thereof. The contemporary epistemologist and moral philosopher, Linda Zagzebski, takesthe nature of moral and rational virtues to be identical. She first adopts a negative approach in her analysis of the nature of virtues, explicatingthe difference between virtues and other notions such as skills, dispositions, intrinsic abilities, habits, rational habitudes, and emotions. In the positive stage of her approach, Zagzebski takes virtues to be matters of behavioral habits, having two general components: internal motivation and success in achieving the intended goal. Given the significance of virtues with respect to the problems and structures of some disciplines such as ethics and epistemology, in this paper I will deal with the nature of virtues and their difference withsimilar categories, with a view on Zagzebski's theory.