The Role of Opportunistic Behavior of Managers in Errors of Earnings Forecast

The lower the deviation of earnings forecast by the managers than the earnings realized, the more the shareholders trust will be. Managers may do opportunistic behaviors for reduction of the diversion of earnings or they may use the company's internal information for their interests. The purpose of this research was investigating the role of opportunistic behavior of managers in errors of earning forecast. The opportunistic behavior of managers includes the earnings management and their stock trading. Earnings management is targeted intervention at changes in income and is measured by Kothari model. Data are analyzed using a sample of 110 companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange for the period of 1386-1392 by using of the Panel Data system and Random Effect Model. The results showed that the earnings management and Earnings Forecasts Errors have a significant negative relationship. Also, Earnings forecasts errors on the sale of shares by managers, increased and Earnings Forecasts Errors at the time of purchase of shares by directors, declined. That is, managers with knowledge of the earnings forecast deviation buy and sell their stocks.