Factors behind Inefficiency of Coup on the Threshold of Islamic Revolution of Iran

From the time Mohammad Reza Pahlavi left Iran to the victory of the revolution on February 11, 1979, the idea of military coup, led by the US and the Shah, against the provisional government took shape in different conditions. These options come to the fore in different circumstances the US administration hesitated about the coup for fear of Soviet intervention and influence of communism as well as the ineffectiveness of their military advisors in Iran. However, the US administration was spreading rumors about the coup and if possible would engineer it as the last resort. The Shah and some of the military officers lost the initiative because of their dependence on the US and mutual mistrust between the army and the Shah and the government the Shah’s heedlessness to the army lower ranks. Thus the army lower ranks gradually joined the revolution and fear of the army officers were fearful of the failure of the coup and hence lost any initiative. In the meantime the role of Imam Khomeini was very effective in the leadership of the Islamic Revolution and hence any coup plan was nipped in the bud. The purpose of this research is to study the internal and external origins of the coup as well as the objectives and conditions of those who tried to engineer the coups and factors behind their failure on the threshold of Iran’s Islamic Revolution.