Critical Review of Suhrawardī's Proofs on Mentally Positedness of Existence with Reliance on Mullā Ṣadrā's Principles

Principality of Existence and the mentally positedness of quiddity is the issue constituting the foundation of many philosophical problems. This principle, as existing today in philosophical fields, has not been nourished in illumination school. Nevertheless, with respect to the principle of “non-addition of existence over quiddity in external world” in his works, and the arguments he has provided to prove this principle under the rubric of proofs on mentally positedness of existence, Suhrawardi is accused of accepting the notion of principality of essence. However, the discourse of the principality of existence in Mullā Ṣadrā’s works is clearly stated with respect to the proofs he has provided to prove this principle, and also due to his criticizing the arguments of those believing in mentally positedness of existence. In this article, it is tried to examine Suhrawardi’s proofs on mentally positedness of existence and Mullā Ṣadrā’s critiques on it.