A Critical Analysis of David Hume's View on the Essentiality and Identity of Mind

David Hume has had a considerable effect on the modern philosophy with his empiricist approach. In his first and the most important philosophical book which was indeed a treatise on human’s nature, he dealt with an explanation of the essentiality and identity of the mind and the mental states. Here, we investigate and review Hume’s view using an analytical-descriptive method. In his negative position, Hume adduces some of the ambiguous or fallacious bases to maintain that the essentiality and identity and absolute simplicity of the mind are without effect and, accordingly, are senseless. In his positive position, however, he defends the essentiality and the imperfect identity of the mental states. Finally, due to contradictions in the positive position, he held that the skepticism is preferable. Skepticism, in Hume’s philosophy, means lack of satisfactory metaphysical account of natural beliefs, and not the lack of the natural beliefs themselves. The main problem in Hume’s account is his negligence of intuitive knowledge and the function of the intellect in using it. It seems that by adducing the intuitive knowledge, one can present a more persuasive account of the soul’s essentiality and its distinction from the phenomena and states of the soul. Accordingly, there is an essence called soul upon which the sensual states rest.