A Stability Analysis of Treaties in Transboundary Rivers Using Game Theory, A Case Study: Harirud River

In recent years, population growth and economic development all around the world has led to an increase in water demand and it has been a serious challenge to its management, particularly, in Shared River Basins. Game theory is one of the most substantial means of conflict resolution and reaching equilibrium in a system. In the present study, the players' strategies were analyzed through the non-cooperative approach of game theory in the shared basin of Harirrud. At first, a comprehensive linear programming model was developed to calculate the player's net profit. Then the players profit was calculated considering the defined non-cooperative scenario. In the next step, the players’ strategy was carried out using different approaches to analyze each of these methods and their stability are examined. The concept of intensive compensation was also used to examine the possibility of changing the Afghanistan's approach from non-cooperative to cooperative. The results showed that in Iran's non-cooperative approach, Iran's profits fall by nearly 45 percent. Similarly, the intensive compensation approach can change the strategy of Afghanistan from non-cooperative to cooperative. Therefore, according to Pareto's optimality, it is possible to increase 40 percent of Iran's profits without reducing profits in Afghanistan.