Jurisprudential comparing the opponent works of gratefulness for enforcing principle of religious innocence

Some divine precepts have a special gratefulness for a responsible person; that is to say that they have been enacted for human welfare and comfort. These precepts are called as gratefulness (imtināni) ordinances, and the cases which cause hardship on a responsible person, are regarded by the jurisprudents as anti gratefulness, and so they are not enforced. The religious innocence is one of the imtināni precepts that because of its very imtināni, its performance is always prohibited according to the jurisprudential and `osuli (principles of jurisprudence) works in two main viewpoints: the first, anti - imtināni cases, and the other is none imtinānii ones. However, the effects of being imtināni of innocence, and the conditions and criterion of its comparison are not discussed and criticized by the jurisprudential and `osuli sources. This paper is the first step in this regards, and comparatively examines the inferential effects of being imtināni of innocence from one of the two main viewpoints, namely the innocence is not enforced in the cases that are not being imtenani; meanwhile in this research, some anti- imtināni situations and their effects are criticized. The achievement of this article is that adapting the being gratefulness of innocence to the jurisprudential inference has some conditions that are failed to consider, while accepting the condition of not being anti - gratefulness for enforcing the religious innocence. In the most jurisprudential adaptations, before anti gratefulness there are other obstacles which prevent performance of innocence or its resulting.