The Realistic Representation of Practical Reason Judgments

One of the divisions of reason is the distinction between theoretical and practical reason. Despite the different interpretations of these terms, the intellectual percepts are sometimes related to beings and at other times to the dos and don’ts and the goods and evils. What process does the reason go through to attain these dos and don’ts? Some theories have been suggested to answer this question. These can be categorized into three groups: the popularity of the practical judgments, their arbitrariness, and their realism. In the article at hand, all three viewpoints are explained and then, the stance that suggests the practical reason judgments should be in relation to something else –i.e. a realist theory – is accepted. In this theory, the intellectual dos and don’ts predict the existence of the necessity between action and its result. The specific exposition of this theory in the article at hand answers three doubts about this theory: the violation of the theory by the first dos, the belongingness of the dos to the currently existing action, and the establishment of the theory based on personal whim rather than intellectual purposes.