Does Free Will Mean Having Alternative Possibilities?

This article studies one of the two current conceptions of free will i.e negative conception or the definition of free will to having alternative possibilities; and tries to assess and ascertain the truth or untruth of this historically popular conception, by means of rational counting of all possible rejections and defends of it. The investigations indicate that the disputes on this truth and untruth is the first dispute that causes philosophers to revolt against one another in debate of free will problem in form of two main groups of Compatibilist and incompatibilist philosophers. The dispute of these two groups begins with debating on the relation between negative free will and Determinism, continues with researching on possibility of free will in a determined world and finally firms in form of two fundamental objections against one another: The harm-mind hypothesis of Determinism on side of Incompatibilists against of Intelligibility challenge on side of Compatibilists. And thus confirming or rejecting of such conception at last depends on assessing these two objections. The result of our assessment in this article consists of rejecting the negative conception.