A Survey of Avicenna's Objections to Infinitism about the Structure of Justification

The structure of justification is one of the important subjects of epistemology. There are various views, on this problem, in which infinitism is one of them. This view was known since Aristotle's time and was declined by philosophers constantly. Avicenna, too, opposes the view, although different from Aristotle. In this inquiry, we, with an analytical-critical approach, explain and criticize Avicenna's objections to infinitism and indicate that his arguments do not reach an end. Avicenna poses three main objections: first, infinitism implicates that no knowledge is obtained; second, its requisite is that the restricted some stands equal to restricting whole, which is impossible; third, its requisite is that some principles of demonstration be unknown. But Avicenna's arguments are based on three presuppositions which are at stake: first, justification is of concepts that have not degrees, rather it is univocal; second, arguments are transferor of justification and not a generator of it; third, if the regress of our arguments is to come about knowledge, its components must be disciplined one after another and be gathered in existence and be actual. In addition, his second argument apart from these presuppositions is still corrupted.