Experimental ego from the perspective of Brentano and Husserl

From the first decades of the 20th century, the crisis of Logicism and its inappropriate propositions for the general basis of the analysis of all the facts is among the most problematic epistemological issues. By studying the specific mental functions of primitive societies from a new angle, Lévy-Bruhl shows that if we want to have an appropriate analysis of their fundamentally different mind and life, it would be necessary to introduce a mentality other than our scientific-logical one. He calls it “mystic mentality”; a mentality which, instead of logic, is based on “prelogic”. The prelogical system is indifferent to the law of non-contradiction and is formed based on the law of “participation”. He claims that these two distinct and independent types of mentality coexist. Hjelmslev basically accepts Lévy-Bruhl's proposal and takes advantage of the epistemological consequences of his ideas as a support for dealing with the general problem of structural analysis. Taking the most general concept of language (or semiotic) as the object of his special immanent theory, he introduces the “sublogical system” as a ground from which the logic and prelogic can be derived. He refers to the law of participation and claims that the basic opposition in a semiotic is that between A and A+(non-A), and not, as logic assumes, the one between A and non-A (contradiction). Regarding this hypothesis, Hjelmslev establishes a formal sublogical calculus in the procedure of his Glossematics while treating the analysis of systems (or the articulation of categories concerning oppositions). It should be considered as an alternative to the logical proposal which is established as the basis of the analysis in many theories such as those of Jakobson, Lévi-Strauss, Chomsky, and so on. In the present study, we intended to explain Lévy-Bruhl’s prelogic and Hjelmslev’s sublogic and their relations, and to cast light on an important possible response to the epistemological problem of the inadequacy of logicism.