The Right of Auditor's Choice and Tax Avoidance Based on Glaser's Choice Theory

In the present research, for the first time, the effect of the auditor's choice of tax avoidance on the basis of Glaser's choice theory has been discussed. The findings of the empirical studies carried out using OLS regression on a sample of 173 active companies in the Tehran Stock Exchange during the period from 2008 to 2019 (1730 year-firm) indicates that the tax avoidance of companies with the right to choose The auditor is significantly more than the companies that do not have the right to choose the auditor. In general, the results of this study show that companies with the right to choose the auditor in their choice of auditor take into account their own interests, including tax avoidance, and auditors are also trying to address the issue of re-election in subsequent audits. In order to obtain satisfaction through cooperation with these companies in the field of tax evasion, and in the absence of this flow, tax avoidance for companies with the right to choose an auditor is more than companies that do not have the right to select an auditor.