The Review of Wierenga's View of the Concept of Omniscience

Divine knowledge – defined as God’ knowledge of the affairs of the world of existence – has always been the subject of philosophical-theological theology discussions, and to date various theories have emerged about it. The contemporary religious philosophers, too, have paid attention it and have rationalized its controversial issues. The first and foremost question about the divine knowledge is the quiddity of its truth, since the other related questions are affected by the response to this question. Investigating different theories, especially contemporary ones, can be helpful in solving the new challenges that have arisen about the belief in the divine omniscience. As a contemporary philosopher of religion, Wierenga has tried to rationally defend the infinite scope of the divine omniscience and respond to the challenges posed by opposing views through conventional methods in the philosophy of religion. However, there are some drawbacks to his account of the concept of omniscience and its properties. In Wierenga's view, omniscience means knowing all true propositions, which is occurrent, non-inferential, and incorrigible. The most important objection to his view is that such a definition cannot represent the truth of the Omniscience but can only be a nominal description arising from the expression of the scope of its adjuncts. There are other drawbacks to his account of the properties of omniscience, the most important of which is using a redundant prefix and a false presupposition.