Consideration and Critique of Horwich’s Solution for the Liar Paradox in terms of the Minimalist Theory of Truth

The Liar Paradox is a self-reference sentence that arrives at a contradiction by reasoning about its self. Some philosophers, like Tarski, have tried to solve this paradox by using formal languages instead of natural languages. Some others consider this riddle as a problem for natural languages. The minimalist theory of truth, presented by Paul Horwich, consider truth only as a logical tool in language and not a deep concept that need philosophical reflection. According to Horwich, we can explain all the occurrences of true predicate in sentences by our natural tendency to accept the Equivalence Schema. He proposes if we eliminate the problematic and self-reference sentences from instantiations on Equivalence Schema then we can be free of the liar paradox. As I show in this article, this solution leads to a defective conception of true predicate and is inconsistent with the main idea of the minimalist theory of truth .