Critical analysis of Philosophical secondary intelligibles in Qādī Sa‘īd Qumī’s thought

Qādī Sa‘īd Qumī has not applied the term “secondary intelligibles” but discusses the philosophical secondary intelligibles as “general concepts” (umūr al-āmmah). General concepts as existence, thingness, possibility & necessity are general, self evident & infinitival meanings that accident & predicate on every thing & are the weakest in externality; In attribution of essences, as the essence or quiddity in general (al māhiya bil ma‘na al a‘am) is an entity & created, the attributes are entities & created either; So Some of his phrases implies metaphysical accidence & externality of these concepts.Of course in discussion on creation, he knows the quiddity in general as the very thing that is created by simple creation of creator & refuses synthetic creation; so the essence will be created by self & the other attributes & accidents will be created by accident or attributed to creation; thus some mentioned ambiguities will be resolved.According to his treatises two interpretation on external reality of philosophical secondary intelligibles can be conceived, first, their weakest share of externality & their metaphysical distinction & second, having no metaphysical entity & their mental prosody.