Analysis of Principles in Deploying Intellectual Rules in Jurisprudential Deduction

scholars and jurists, mainly by challenging between facts and credentials. They have disputed the jurisprudents' rational argumentations as put forward in their works.   By induction in this regard, we achieve three important views: general prohibition of the use of rational rules in jurisprudential inference, non-prohibition of quoting rational rules in jurisprudential citation, permissibility of citing to rational rules, and promising in detail among the rules of reason.   Adopting a basis for this issue depends on the analysis of two minor and major debates; the minor discussion is that whether the Osuli and jurisprudential propositions are factual or credential.  Assuming on its credential nature, it is argued that if the major issue regarding the citation of rational principles in credential discussion is true or not.   In this paper, with the aim of focusing on the position of rational rules in jurisprudential inference, the authors support the rationalist principles and by analyzing the principles and arguments in both minor and major debates have focused on the problem of facts and credentials confusion to prove this assumption that in order to deduce the rules of jurisprudence, based on the real support that religious laws and credentials  have, we can use the rules of real and rational sciences, and in this regard, we will express a new detailed theory and standard to cite the rules of reason in deriving religious rules.