Investigating The Effect Of Political Connections And Economic Sanctions On Cost Stickiness With Emphasis On The Role Institutional Ownersheep: Test of Political Economy and Agency Theory in Tehran Stock Exchange

Because in times of crisis and economic sanctions, managers see an increase in demand as permanent and a decrease as temporary; If this is reflected in the decision, the stickiness will come at a cost. Therefore, it is expected that at a time when the general state of the economy is growing or in the face of economic sanctions, senior corporate executives will also consider this situation in in-house decisions and the cost stickiness will be affected differently. To take. Therefore, this study examines the impact of political relations and economic sanctions on cost stickiness, emphasizing the role of institution ownership in the Tehran Stock Exchange during the period 2013 to 2021 using the information of 150 companies. The hypotheses were tested by multiple regression using generalized least squares (EGLS) method with table data arrangement.The results of the research hypotheses showed that asymmetric behavior (cost stickiness) is present in administrative, public and sales costs, and in companies that have political relations, the stickiness of costs decreases, but in the context of economic sanctions, the stickiness of costs They become more and more sticky. In other words, in crisis situations such as economic sanctions; Having managers with political connections can help export products and supply raw materials, tax breaks, easier access to credit and financing for the company, and keep the company's conditions stable in the short term, all of which can lead to a reduction. Sticky costs. Also, in the conditions of economic sanctions, due to the increase in the cost of products and fluctuations in exchange rates and raw materials, the amount of sales of companies decreases and their costs increase sharply. They adjust income, which leads to cost stickiness as conditions improve. Institution ownership as a corporate governance mechanism also reduces asymmetric behavior in public and administrative spending, and in companies that have political relationships or are subject to sanctions, the existence of institution owners reduces the adhesion of costs. In other words, institution ownership reduces the stickiness of costs by forcing managers to reduce public and administrative costs.