Violence against metaphysics: A critical study of radical criticisms against metaphysical violence

One of the most radical criticisms by contemporary philosophers against metaphysics refers to the violence embedded in and developed by metaphysics. This criticism rejects the possibility of thinking about Being arguing that metaphysical thought due to its insistence on thinking clearly and distinctly, and for its method of transcendence results in suppression, possession, and tyranny. Different versions of this criticism unravel many secret points within the history of philosophy; yet, they all relate a specific narration of the history of philosophy that can be criticized itself. Many of such criticisms involve a kind of bias, sophistication, and negligence in their reading (and interpreting) of the history of philosophy. They rarely refer to philosophical texts, and their claims seldom are supported by a close reading of a text in its context. Contrary to this criticism, a different narration of the story of philosophy can be provided in which metaphysics and morality have the same origin. This article studies two versions of the criticisms against metaphysical violence: that of Levinas, as the most significant critic of metaphysics, and of Mc Cumber, as he has explained in more details how metaphysical violence transpires on the realm of act. Then, an explanation will be provided to argue for another narration of metaphysics in which metaphysics is a moral act in its origin and in its development: it requires to be humble in front of reality, and to be in search of the common foundation between the self and the other.