Analysis of Driver-Police Interaction Using Game Theory
In this study, the strategic interaction between traffic police and the driver is analyzed using game theory in the form of a two-stage dynamic game with incomplete information that the type of players is determined by nature. In the first stage, the police decide whether to fine or not, and in the second stage, the driver decides whether to pay a bribe or not. The driver compares the amount of the fine and the cost of the bribe. It can be concluded that the more lawful the police, the lower the bribe payment. Punishment of bribe recipients and payers can also prevent bribery and help eradicate possible corruption in this important organ of the country.
- حق عضویت دریافتی صرف حمایت از نشریات عضو و نگهداری، تکمیل و توسعه مگیران میشود.
- پرداخت حق اشتراک و دانلود مقالات اجازه بازنشر آن در سایر رسانههای چاپی و دیجیتال را به کاربر نمیدهد.