A Comparative Analysis of the Truth of Fact-itself from the Viewpoint of Philosophers and Mystics

One of the important issues in philosophy and mysticism, with considerable ontological and epistemological effects, is explaining the truth of fact-itself (nafs al-amr). This is because the truth of fact-itself is directly related to affirmation and falsification of epistemic propositions and statements. The subject of the present inquiry is a comparative investigation of the views of Islamic philosophers and mystics regarding the truth of fact-itself in a descriptive-analytical method. The related data were gathered through library studies. The inquiry aims at a general expression and stating the common and different points among the views of most philosophers and mystics regarding the fact-itself and presenting a brief analysis on them. The most important findings of the inquiry are as follows: the mystics’ interpretations of the fact-itself are focused on the ontological sphere and are proposed for explaining the existential unity of the universe. But the philosophers’ interpretations are focused on the epistemological sphere and aim at explaining the verity and falsity of the epistemic propositions. According to this approach, some of the philosophers’ interpretations such as ‘fact and outside in particular sense’, ‘active intellect’, and ‘existence-self’, are not the precise and right interpretations of fact-itself. But, some others such as ‘general affirmation’ or ‘absolute container of affirmation of external realities’ and ‘container of rational affirmation of the facts’ are justifiable. It seems that ‘thing-itself’ (nafs al-shayʾ) is the most precise and most comprehensive interpretation that enjoys the capability to explain the verity and falsity of any epistemic proposition.