Could Science Challenge Philosophical Naturalism? On the Relation of Philosophical and Methodological Naturalism

The long-term Naturalism-Supernaturalism debate among philosophers has been developed with respect to the question of the existence of supernatural entities. According to philosophical Naturalism, all there is are natural; while supernaturalists postulate supernatural entities like God, soul, etc. in their ontological framework. Recently the most heated debates on this issue are informed by scientific theories and the philosophers of both camps invoke the contemporary scientific achievements in their philosophical arguments. This paper is concerned with the question: is it possible for philosophical Naturalism to be challenged by scientific theories? The importance of this question is due to the dilemma it puts in the foreground of philosophical naturalists. If the philosophical naturalist answers the question negatively, she cannot legitimately appeal to scientific theories as empirical evidence in favor of her position. Because then science by default and regardless of its empirical content would confirm Naturalism. On the other hand, the acceptance of the possibility of challenge would be available just at the expense of discarding methodological Naturalism. Methodological Naturalism as a principle that excludes any supernatural entity or supernaturalistic premise from scientific explanations, guarantees the compatibility of scientific worldview with Naturalism, and eliminates the possibility of challenge. Therefore, if the Naturalist wants to benefit from science in her arguments against supernaturalists in a non-dogmatic manner, she has to give up methodological Naturalism as a necessary principle of scientific inquiry.