Theory-ladenness of Observation Thesis and Religious Science

In this article, I examine the role of non-epistemic values and presuppositions in scientific theories. One of the cases that can show this role-playing is the theoryladenness of observations. Theory-ladenness of observation thesis expresses the idea that theoretical expectations (derived from non-empirical values and presuppositions) pervade the scientific process, especially that these theoretical expectations can play a role in determining scientific observations. Relying on this role-playing, some advocates of religious science defend the possibility of religious science. After investigating one of Dr. Bagheri's critiques of Dr. Golshani's theory of religious science, I focus on the effect on the Theoryladenness of observation thesis in the middle stage of the construction of religious science. At least in the first sight, this effect can play a constructive role in defending religious science. But, paying attention to the (process of) scientific practice, especially according to Alan Chalmers' concept of objectified observation, I try to show that the theory-dependence of observation at the middle stage can’t play a constructive role in defending religious science because experimental outputs, to a great extent, are determined by what the world (reality) does rather than by the theoretical views or mental content of experimenters. In the following, I explain the objectified observations can be generally accepted, and theories can be evaluated relatively impartially according to these observations. Most theories of religious science ignore what I explained because they place extreme stress on the theory-ladenness of observation thesis, and this extreme stress leads to the denial of the impartial judgment of scientific theories.