An Assessment of Ishtiyaque Haji’s Views About the Necessity of Alternative Possibilities for Moral Obligations

Recently, Ishtiyaque Haji, one of the famous philosophers in the field of Free will, has argued in several works that although moral responsibility does not require alternative possibilities due to the success of the Frankfurt examples, moral obligations require alternative possibilities and ironically even The success of Frankfurt examples in negating the principle of alternative possibilities can not harm the necessity of alternative possibilities for moral obligations. In this regard, he tries to formulate arguments by referring to some intuitive principles, such as equivalence, Kant’s Law/Obligation and Kant’s Law/Impermissible, which show that ought, wrongness and rightness require alternative possibilities. After examining Haji's arguments, this article has reviewed his answers to one of the most important problems raised against the intuitive principles that underpin his arguments. The article has finally concluded that his argument about the existence of moral blameworthiness in situations devoid of all objective moral obligations is not acceptable.