Murder or Abortion of the Fetus; from Jurisprudential Sanctions to Legal Separation

Removing fetus is one of the issues on which the fact of murder or abortion can lead to different sentences, whether it was a natural fetus or a laboratory fetus. This research aims to investigate the difference between the verdicts and effects of the truth of murder or abortion for fetus in jurisprudential and narrative texts and criminal law before and after the Islamic Revolution and with the aim of clarifying legal challenges and the possibility of contagion of these sentences in laboratory embryos.

The present study is a descriptive-analytical method and using library data including real and cyber, so all the reasons that are full of jurisprudential, narrative and criminal law in the field of murder or abortion can be cited, and then analytic method will be discussed, the difference of its rulings and effects and the possibility of its spread to laboratory fetus.

By examining the jurisprudential texts and the validity of the texts, the title of murder can be considered as true if the embryo in which the soul is incarnate and otherwise the title of abortion will be realized. In the case of the title of murder, jurisprudential rulings such as prohibiting the inheritance of the murderer intentionally or unintentionally from all the property of the fetus or from the blood money and also the provisions of the statutory rights, including the provisions prescribed in Articles 47, 157, 612 and 636 of the Islamic Penal Code will be true.