Non-instrumental Reasons and the Problem of Skepticism in Conciliationism

Conciliationism is one of the famous approaches to the epistemic challenge of peer disagreement. However, this approach faces many problems, the most important of which is skepticism: an agent ought to suspend judgment about any belief over which she encounters peer disagreement. Ghazaleh Hojjati in “Conciliationist Approach to the Challenge of Religious Disagreement,” tried to answer this problem relying on the non-instrumental (or synchronic) reasons. In this article, I scrutinize and examine this answer proposed by Hajati. After comparing non-instrumental reasons in empirical sciences, on the one side, and in religion and philosophy, on the other side, I try to show that although in empirical sciences, non-instrumental reasons are independent and impartial, non-instrumental reasons in religious issues will probably be biased and non-independent. Nonetheless, a conciliationist asserts that the sides of disagreement are rational to keep their opinions only when using independent and impartial non-instrumental reasons. Hence, it seems that Hojjati’s response cannot refute the skepticism resulting from conciliationism in religious (or philosophical) debates.