Empowering Iran oil companies to be self-sufficient in dealing with American and European sanctions by designing a cooperative game model

The aim of this research is to design scenarios based on cooperative game theory models to investigate the observed rewards and penalties resulting from knowledge sharing or non-sharing among companies. The research population includes managers and experts from 30 top private companies active in the field of oil and gas projects. The research methodology is based on Kumar's classification, which is applied, interpretive, exploratory, and includes both quantitative and qualitative aspects. This study underscores the importance of efficient knowledge sharing as a means to foster collaboration among investors in the portfolios of the National Iranian Oil Company to compete with foreign competitors during sanctions.Upon reviewing the results of four scenarios derived from the game, it is observed that the rewards perceived by companies from knowledge sharing depend on the behavior resulting from knowledge sharing by other companies. The more capable an organization is in the influential factors of knowledge transfer and higher innovation, the greater the returns companies will obtain through cooperation. Sensitivity analysis regarding the costs of project cooperation, which arises due to the difficulty of implementing joint projects, shows that as costs increase, companies shift from a cooperation strategy towards a retaliation strategy and then towards a non-cooperation strategy. These strategies are determined based on aligning the results of the profit equation designed with three interrelated cooperative games: the prisoner's dilemma, the hawk-dove game, and assurance game.