Augustine's Language in Wittgenstein and Gadamer's Words

What is called language? In the history of Western philosophy, we have different answers to this question. However, according to Wittgenstein and Gadamer, these different answers are basically similar, and both criticize this basic approach. Gadamer refers to the history of Western philosophy as the history of forgetfulness of language. But he regards Augustine as an exception in this history; for Gadamer, Augustine has appreciated the central status of language and the vital relation between language and thought through his idea of the inner word. However, Wittgenstein introduces Augustine as the main agent of the basic approach of Western philosophy to language, raising his criticisms of this basic approach by objecting to Augustine's claims. In this article, I review these two different interpretations and think about the possibility of making an affinity and compromise between Gadamer's narration of Augustine's idea of the inner word and Wittgenstein's philosophy of language.