Evaluation of the Relationship between Shareholder Competition Intensity and Performance and Value of Active Stock Exchange Companies: Evidence from Managerial Entrenchment or Convergence of Interests
The primary purpose of this study was to examine the evidence of managerial entrenchment or convergence of interest’s hypothesis in evaluating the relationship between the shareholder competition’s intensity on the return and value of Iranian stock exchange companies. This research is applied, a post-event method and descriptive type; it is included in the category of threshold nonlinear regression models. In this article, the data of 127 production companies active in the stock exchange market over the period of 2012-2021 were used.The results confirm the existence of a threshold non-linear relationship between the intensity of shareholder competition and the performance of the company; In other words, if the share of state owners increases, the hypothesis of convergence of interests prevails in the managerial entrenchment. This means that the major shareholders try to reduce agency conflict through control and supervision and align their interests with the managers and minority stockholders to increase the company’s value and return. Conclusion At high levels of concentration, shareholders by dominating the market are able to benefit from tariff exchange rates, cheap feed, and government support; therefore, these stockholders being in the safe margin, do not feel threatened by competitors and can use their resources in profitable activities with high return and value
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