A Critical Re-reading of the Components of Happiness in the Aristotelian Theory

Any theorizing about the concept of happiness requires an explanation of its various components (including preliminaries, conditions, instances and parts). Attention to the fundamental role of happiness in applied theosophy, recognized as the intermediary and the guarantee of practical extension of philosophy, illustrates the double importance of such an explanation in the practical application of the theory. In the happiness theory of Aristotle, which depends on some special conceptual elements such as the supreme good/end, self-sufficiency, function, virtue and activity, two theoretical and ethical virtues are taken as components of happiness, with other elements such as wealth, friendship and health being considered as its conditions. But ambiguity in Aristotle’s words has caused some disagreements among his commentators and has divided them into two groups: the advocates of “Dominant Happiness” versus those of “Inclusive Happiness”. In the first viewpoint, only theoretical virtues enjoy essential and primary importance and in the second perspective, both theoretical and ethical virtues are paid due attention simultaneously. This  study has been an attempt to find the roots of the above-mentioned ambiguity in order to resolve it and, hence, enhance practical efficacy through critically scrutinizing Aristotle's theory of happiness  It seems possible to propose a “Covering Happiness” theory, by presupposing “The Essential End” as the definition of happiness (instead of Supreme End) and attending to the whole of the nature of a kind (instead of its differentia) in the reasoning called “Function argument”; such a theory extends the components of happiness, presents a proper classification of them, and therefore will be practically more efficient in resolving inconsistencies among them.