The Cognitive Study of Religion and the Problem of Explanation

This article evaluates the success of cognitive models of religion derived from empirical research. The cognitive science of religion (CSR) is a field that uses methods and theories of cognitive science to understand how the human mind creates and transmits religious thoughts, beliefs and behaviors. The article's main point is that the success of CSR hinges on the explanatory power of cognitive models. We demonstrate that cognitive explanations encounter several limitations that cast doubt on their validity as good models. (1) Theoretical foundations: cognitive explanations rely on a third-person perspective and neglect first-person experience of the religious. They fail to recognize the interdependence of reflective and intuitive knowledge in religious people. They presuppose methodological naturalism, which is incompatible with multidimensional nature of religious phenomena. (2) Exclusionist view: They disregard crucial factors in the emergence, maintenance, enhancement and diffusion of religious beliefs such as revelation and prophecy, education, society and culture.  (3) Scientific evidence: it is challenging to replicate the religious experience by neuroscientific explanations in a laboratory setting. The findings of some researches contradict the hyperactive agency detection device; Autistic people exhibit the opposite of the theory of strategic social information. This article, while discussing the challanges of explanation in cognitive models, proposes some suggestions for improving and completing these models: paying attention to first-person stance of religious agents, highlighting the role of conscious cognition in believers, adopting methodological pluralism in studying religion, considering the historical and cultural contexts of religions and having a realistic view on development of theism.