A Critique of the Adequacy of the Bundle Theory of Mind in Explaining "Personal Identity"
The extent of the strength of theories of self and body to explain the problem of "personal identity" can indicate the coherence, strength, and consequently the validity of these theories. Among the theories related to self and body that do not consider a substantial essence for the self is Hume’s bundle theory of mind. This theory argues that the mind is nothing but successive series of impressions and perceptions. However, if we were to say that the mind is nothing more than successive impressions, we would define the mind as something lacking stability. As a result, we will face difficulty in explaining the challenge of "personal identity," which requires stability. Advocates of the bundle theory of mind have proposed various components such as memory, contiguity, resemblance, and causality in constructing personal identity, based on the principle of sequence of impressions. In this article, we critique these components and demonstrate that the bundle theory of mind does not have the ability to explain "personal identity" under any circumstances. Ultimately a holistic explanation for the personal identity is proposed.
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