The Narrow and Broad Scope of Public Rights from the Perspective of Objective Consequentialism

The concept of public rights is commonly understood as the rights of the general public. However, when scrutinized more closely, this notion becomes somewhat ambiguous, leading to questions and disagreements among legal doctrines and jurists. This ambiguity revolves around the precise definition of the term, its instances, and its scope, such as whether it pertains solely to criminal law or extends to non-criminal law. Examining the scope of public rights reveals numerous and sometimes conflicting interpretations. Legal and judicial opinions on the scope of public rights generally fall into two general yet conflicting approaches, namely narrow and broad. Given the divergent viewpoints, it is crucial to adopt a valid interpretive approach within the legal system to establish a systematic framework aimed at reaching an understanding. Objective consequentialism, as a normative-based interpretive method, serves as a valuable theoretical tool for evaluating these approaches. In this line, the present study sought to address the following research question: Which of the two approaches, narrow or broad, to the scope of public rights is deemed acceptable from the perspective of objective consequentialism?

Legal and judicial opinions concerning public rights can generally be categorized into two competing approaches. On one hand, there are viewpoints advocating for a narrow interpretation, which suggests limiting the scope of public rights in times of uncertainty. On the other hand, there are perspectives that advocate for a broader understanding of public rights, incorporating a wider range of interpretations and instances. Although there is no coherent and methodical discussion on this matter in legal literature thus far, various schools of legal interpretation have debated different methods, such as objective consequentialism. In objective consequentialism, the focus lies on discerning the purpose of the law, so the interpreter, whether a judge or a lawyer, seeks to deduce the purpose of the law from the text itself and other relevant sources. Subsequently, they interpret provisions of the law in light of the general purpose. In this method, justification for interpretation is grounded on the objective purpose behind establishing the rule. The purpose of the law can be inferred from the very text of the law, including its title, preamble, or relevant chapters. Furthermore, the purpose may be predestined or assumed, with implications being inferred through logical or judicious readings of the text of the law—based on the premise that the legislator is judicious. Therefore, it is assumed that the legislator has intended for legal provisions to have meaningful effects rather than being rendered null or futile. Objective consequentialism seeks to uncover the underlying purpose behind a given law or provision.

The present study relied on objective consequentialism, which is an interpretive method based on the normative ground, in order to evaluate the two approaches concerning the scope of pubic rights. The study aimed to address the following research question: Which of the two approaches, narrow or broad, to the scope of public rights is deemed acceptable from the perspective of objective consequentialism?

According to objective consequentialism, fostering a broad understanding of the concept of public rights while maintaining a systematic view of functions of the judiciary body can result in an appropriately balanced understanding aimed at claiming public rights. The present study synthesized the opinions sharing a common essence and overarching direction, discussing the existing legal approaches regarding the scope of public rights. Additionally, considering the principles of the Constitution, a hypothesis (called the conceptual approach derived from purposiveness) was formulated and tested about the distinction between the scope of public rights—as outlined in the Constitution—and the restoration of public rights. The scope of public rights can be either narrowed or expanded, considering the purpose of the law and of justice outlined in each instance, as well as the implications derived from a judicious interpretation of the law.

Public rights can be re-evaluated with an eye to the purpose of the law, hence interpreted as rights and interests arising from the objective goal of the law. In this light, the scope of public rights becomes meaningful considering the purpose of the law, the justice it guarantees in each instance, and the implications stemming from the judicious interpretation of the law. Therefore, there two central points here: rights (the conceptual standpoint) and the negation of oppression and injustice (the functional standpoint). From the conceptual standpoint, public rights extend to legal rights. Yet the functional standpoint would include those instances of rights that have been or are about to be unjustly taken away from their rightful owners, making it impossible for the beneficiaries (whether individuals or groups) to reclaim them.