Abduction: An Argumentative Process or an Instinctive Mechanism?

There are various theories regarding the logical structure of abduction. Peirce, the logician who introduced this type of reasoning, placed it alongside deductive and inductive reasoning. However, the logical form and inferential process involved in abduction remain unclear, leading to questions about whether abduction is truly an argumentative process. In this article, we aim to support this perspective by demonstrating that Peirce's writings implicitly suggest that abduction is instinctive, and if abduction is indeed instinctive, it cannot be considered an argument. Additionally, drawing on the views of earlier thinkers such as Avicenna, we argue that abduction may be related to the faculty of estimation, which is common to both humans and other animals. This perspective helps explain why animals can transcend mere sensory data and engage in something akin to forming natural or causal hypotheses. Furthermore, findings from contemporary experimental psychology indicate that the human mind employs multiple systems for decision-making and judgment, not all of which are argumentative. For instance, Daniel Kahneman identifies two decision-making systems in humans: the first is non-argumentative and evolutionary, while the second is logical. Based on examples of abduction, it can be considered a process belonging to System 1 of the mind, which operates quickly and non-argumentatively.