Policy Making on Anti-Money Laundering in the Iranian Banking System: An Analysis of Stakeholder Interactions through Game Theory

In the fight against money laundering, the banking system requires collaboration with a diverse set of stakeholders, including regulatory and legislative bodies, banks, international organizations, technology companies, and customers, each with distinct objectives. These stakeholders have been identified through content analysis and interviews with banking industry experts utilizing theoretical saturation sampling. Employing game theory and graph models, interactions among these groups have been analyzed to achieve equilibrium in both the current and future states. Evolutionary path analysis has elucidated pathways to equilibrium, highlighting the role of technology companies in pioneering supervisory innovations and the efforts of international organizations in implementing global standards. The findings indicate that the current equilibrium state does not align with policymakers' ideals. Therefore, reverse game analysis has been employed to explore intervention strategies aimed at adjusting stakeholders' preferences. The ideal state encompasses stringent enforcement of laws by regulatory bodies, enhancement of internal systems by banks, and active cooperation of customers with the imposed limitations.