The Behavior of the Government and the Contractor in the Early Termination of BOT Projects for the Construction of Suburban Pedestrian Bridges Using Game Theory

The purpose of this research is to model the behavior of the government and the contractor in the early termination of BOT projects for the construction of suburban pedestrian bridges, using game theory. The case study includes BOT projects for the construction of pedestrian bridges in the Tehran-Semnan highway. By applying game theory and analyzing the behavior of the parties in the form of a bargaining game, the consequences of the decisions of the government and the contractor in the conditions of early termination of projects have been investigated and a model has been presented to predict these behaviors and their economic results. The data used in this research were extracted from the experts of the General Department of Highways and Road Transport of Tehran and the managers of BOT projects, as well as related documents. The proposed model provides three key features for the analysis of parties' behaviors, and using a practical example, these features have been calculated and verified. The results show that the amount of compensation and the decisions around it are directly related to the behavior of the government and the contractor; High compensation could lead to a government counteroffer or construction of a new bridge, but may delay negotiations, while low compensation would cause the project to continue inefficiently and harm the public interest. Finally, managed anticipated behaviors in the public and private sector and reaching an agreement on compensation is suggested as a suitable solution to reduce behavioral conflicts and maintain public interests.